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ARTICLE
AUCTIONING THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF LIFE:
CARBON AUCTION, THE LAW, AND
GLOBAL WARMING
STEVEN FERREY*
The pursuit of money often clouds or derails even the best inten-
tions. A recurring theme of great literature-the conflict between the
pursuit of massive revenue and the best intentions, in this case to con-
trol climate change before a world crosses the tipping point of no
return-is embodied in the United States' legal requirements on
global warming. A legal challenge on the new concept of auctioning
rights to emit CO,, a building block of life itself, may determine the
future success of carbon control ofglobal warming. Ten Eastern states,
taking the lead with their new Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
(RGGI), have started this legal controversy with their first-in-the-U.S.
regulation to control global warming C0 2 gases beginning in 2009.
These ten states, contrary to prior decades of US. emissions regulation,
and even contrary to the European Union (E. U) carbon regulation
and the Kyoto Protocol, have chosen to auction or sell the right to emit
C0 2 to the highest bidders, raising hundreds of millions of dollars of
additional revenues annually but throwing carbon control into legal
limbo.
The official RGGI-state rationale is to prevent emitters of C02
from gaining any "windfall." The concept of auctioning emission
rights to the highest bidder lacks legal precedent, while standing as one
of the most significant new revenue-raising mechanisms of this cen-
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nations. He is the author of six books and more than seventy-five articles on the energy-
environmental legal and policy interface. These books include THE LAW OF INDEPEN-
DENT POWER (27th ed. 2009), a three-volume book updated annually, and RENEWABLE
POWER IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: WINNING THE WAR ON GLOBAL WARMING
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tury. Without legal precedent, it has provoked those entities subject to
regulation, invoking legal challenge, and could even raise Constitu-
tional impediments to the entire success of carbon control. The out-
come of this legal confrontation will determine the future of U.S. and
international carbon control. California, and more than a dozen
Western and Midwestern states, are on the verge of following the lead
of the RGGI states, as may Congress and even the next phase of the
international Kyoto Protocol.
This article examines this innovative legal construct that
launches the auctioning of carbon emission rights. It contrasts the
GHG regulatory systems in the ten RGGI states, California, other
U.S. regional carbon-regulating states, the Kyoto Protocol, and the
European Union system, to compare the legal authority and vulnera-
bility of auctions, rather than allocations, of C02 emission allowances.
The revenues and costs of these new regulatory constructs are analyzed
against Constitutional and other issues.
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Carbon dioxide levels now stand above their highest levels for the
last 650,000 years. In early 2008 we learnt that the North Polar
ice cap is melting so fast that some scientists are predicting that in
seven years time it will completely disappear in Summer.
-HRH, Prince Charles, the Prince of Wales'
I. THE NEW ERA OF POLLUTION AND AUCTIONS
Good policy ideas do not always fit into the legal framework of
American law. Carbon regulation is being implemented aggressively by
half of the U.S. states in response to the Kyoto Protocol and the scientific
imperative to do something quickly to address global warming. These
leading U.S. states are pioneering the new concept of auctioning, rather
than allocating, the right to emit carbon. This concept is entirely new.
Auctioning has never been done before either internationally or in the
five U.S. programs, which currently allocate without charge to polluters
the right to emit other pollutants under cap-and-trade regulation.
Auction is attractive. It potentially raises billions of dollars of reve-
nue in return for permission to emit carbon. That revenue is greater
than the cost of extending the recent Bush Administration tax cuts.
Meanwhile, the 2008 financial meltdown has increased pressure to raise
revenues through auction rather than the traditional allocation of
allowances without charge. 2
And since auction of carbon emission rights is not marketed as a tax
increase, it is extremely attractive to policymakers. Nevertheless, the cost
of electric power to consumers could significantly increase. The first
states to implement this new auction concept in 2009 may prove so
attractive that the international European Union allowance scheme might
attempt to emulate the U.S. experience after 2012.
While this might work in a federal system in an E.U. country, it is a
different fit in the U.S. system of bifurcated state and federal authority
over power markets. State efforts to increase the cost of retail power to
1. HRH The Prince of Wales, Preface to CLIMATE CHANGE: A GUIDE TO CAR-
BON LAW AND PRACTICE 5 (Paul Q. Watchman ed., 2008) (hereinafter Watchman].
This is a new book in which the author of this article has co-authored the chapter on
carbon regulation in the United States; see Steven Ferrey & Courtney A. Queen, Carbon
Regulation in the United States, in id. at 211.
2. See Doug Obey, Wall Street Bailouts May Intensif Focus on Carbon Trading Reve-
nues, CARBON CONTROL NEWS, Sept. 22, 2008, at 1, 4.
20091
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account for carbon costs-to attempt to legally arrest the "leakage" of
power from other out-of-state high-carbon sources-also raise Constitu-
tional issues. These various legal issues surrounding the auction or allo-
cation of allowances are examined in Part IV. Leading up to that
analysis, Part II looks at the risk of carbon emissions, particularly from
the power sector, contributing to global warming. Part III analyzes the
choices made on auction or allocation of allowances by key U.S. states
and by the European Union and Kyoto Protocol. Also analyzed are legal
positions of each of these programs to allow external carbon offsets to be
created as an alternative means of compliance.
Climate change has been called "the greatest market failure the
world has ever seen." 3 The stakes are huge for both the planet and finan-
cial systems involved in the trading of carbon. The world market for
carbon allowances would approximate the world market for all sweet
crude oil sales. This is about as big a market as one can imagine. Legal
challenges surround this new carbon future. Terry Tamminen, an energy
advisor to California Governor Schwarzenegger, stated that potential
legal challenges could pose the biggest stumbling block to climate change
initiatives.4 This article explores the legal issues just beginning to surface
around the allocation and auction of the rights to emit carbon into the
atmosphere.
II. THE CARBON IMPACT ON THE ECOSYSTEM
In the last few months, it has been harder and harder to mis-
interpret the signs that our world is spinning out of kilter. Major
cities in North and South America, Asia and Australia are nearly
out of water due to massive droughts and melting glaciers. Des-
perate farmers are losing their livelihoods. Peoples in the frozen
Arctic and on low-lying Pacific islands are planning evacuations of
places they have long called home. Unprecedented wildfires have
forced a half million people from their homes in one country and
caused a national emergency that almost brought down the gov-
ernment in another. Climate refugees have migrated into areas
already inhabited by people with different cultures, religions, and
traditions, increasing the potential for conflict. Stronger storms in
the Pacific and Atlantic have threatened whole cities. Millions
have been displaced by massive flooding in South Asia, Mexico,
and 18 countries in Africa. As temperature extremes have
increased, tens of thousands have lost their lives. We are recklessly
3. U.K. GOV'T, Executive Summary (Short) to STERN REVIEW REPORT ON THE
ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE viii (2006), available at http://www.hm-trea-
sury.gov.uk/d/CLOSED-SHORT_executivesummary.pdf [hereinafter STERN REPORT].
4. Lisa Weinzimer, Schwarzenegger Adviser Says States, Regions Will Take Lead on
Climate Programs, PLATTs ELEC. UTIL. WK., June 16, 2008, at 7, 8.
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burning and clearing our forests and driving more and more spe-
cies into extinction. The very web of life on which we depend is
being ripped and frayed.
-Al Gore
5
A. A Short History of Carbon and Conventional Life Forms
Prior to the Industrial Revolution, Earth's average temperature had
been naturally maintained at 59°F (15'C).6 Since the Industrial Revolu-
tion, carbon emissions resulting from combusting fossil fuels to provide
mechanical and electrical energy have poured into the atmosphere.7
Atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2 ) levels now are approximately 33%
higher than in pre-industrial times.8 Global carbon concentrations in the
atmosphere are now accelerating at four times the rate they did in the
1990s. 9
Greenhouse gases (GHGs) are transparent to radiation in the visible
part of the spectrum, but absorbent in the lower frequencies, including
the infrared part of the spectrum. Thus, they retain outgoing radiation
trying to leave Earth, and raise ambient global temperature. CO2 con-
centrations in the atmosphere remain for decades, or even centuries.'"
Temperature changes move in direct relation to these increasing atmos-
pheric GHG concentrations.
Earth has traditionally maintained a balanced temperature because
it returns enough of the sun's energy into space to keep the atmosphere
from heating. Other celestial globes react differently. The planet Venus
is so swarthed in GHGs that its surface temperature is several hundred
degrees above that of Earth, and water cannot exist in liquid form. t '
5. Al Gore, Nobel Peace Prize Acceptance Speech (Dec. 10, 2007), available at
http://blog.algore.com/2007/12/nobel-prize-acceptance-speech.html.
6. Union of Concerned Scientists, Global Warming FAQ, http://www.ucsusa.org/
global warming/science-and-impacts/science/global-warming-faq.html (last visited Apr.
2, 2009).
7. Pew Ctr. for Climate Change, Global Warming Basics, http://www.pewclimate.
org/global-warming-basics/about (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
8. See Arnold W. Reitze Jr., Global Warming, [2001] 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law
Inst.) 10,253, 10,254 ("Compared with pre-industrial levels, CO 2 concentration in the
atmosphere has risen from about 270 to 280 parts per million by volume (ppmv) to over
360 ppmv in 1999, N 20 has risen from 270 ppmv to 310 ppmv, and CH 4 concentration
has increased from 770 parts per billion by volume (ppbv) to over 1,700 ppbv.").
9. Dean Scott, Global Carbon Concentrations Accelerating at Almost Four Times
Growth Rate of 1990s, [2008] 39 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1967.
10. NAT'L AcAD. oF Scis. ET AL., UNDERSTANDING AND RESPONDING TO CLI-
MATE CHANGE 20 (2008), http://dels.nas.edu/dels/rpt_briefs/climate-change_2008_
final.pdf.
11. Henry Bortman, Was Venus Alive? 'The Signs are Probably There, "SPACE, Aug.
26, 2004, http://www.space.com/scienceastronomy/venus life_040826.html.
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Mars has no GHGs and its temperature is too cold to allow water to exist
in liquid form on its surface. 12 GHGs determine temperature.
For the past fifty years, scientists have known about the warming
effects of carbon dioxide. 13 The National Academies of Science of many
of the industrialized countries have endorsed the climate-changing effects
of global warming gases. 4 The United Nations Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC) determined that eleven of the years between
1995 and 2006 rank among the twelve warmest since instrumentation
records were first accumulated in 1850.15
CO2 is the main byproduct of fossil fuel combustion, and therefore
results from any energy production that uses oil, coal, natural gas, or
other solid waste fuels. When burned for electric production, all release
atmospheric carbon. 6 98.3% of anthropogenic CO 2 emissions are from
combustion of fossil fuels, and 82.6% of U.S. GHG emissions are attrib-
uted to CO 2.17 More than one-third of CO2 emissions are attributable
to the electric power sector. The sheer amount of CO2 emitted into the
environment is enormous and persists for 100 years.' 8
Electric power is a crucial sector of the economy not only because of
its absolute contribution to the problem, but also because of its rate of
growth. Electric power production consumes 36% of U.S. fossil fuels,
which releases 41% of CO 2 from burning such fuels.19 These emissions
12. D. M. Hurtak, Acad. for Future Sci., The Quest to Terraform Mars (2005),
http://www.affs.org/html/the-quest to-terraformmars.html; see also Am. Geophysical
Union, Using Global Warming to Create Conditions frr Life on Mars, MARS TODAY, Feb. 3,
2005, http://www.marstoday.com/news/viewpr.html?pid=16055 (describing ways in
which the introduction of laboratory-made greenhouse gases could theoretically make
Mars habitable).
13. Naomi Oreskes, The Long Consensus on Climate Change, WASH. POST, Feb. 1,
2007, at A15.
14. JOINT SCIENCE ACADEMIES' STATEMENT: GLOBAL RESPONSE TO CLIMATE
CHANGE (June 2005), available at http://royalsociety.org/displaypagedoc.asp?id=207 4 2.
15. INTERGOVTL. PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), FOURTH ASSESSMENT
REPORT, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 30 (2007), http://www.ipcc.ch/
pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf [hereinafter IPCC FOURTH SYNTHESIS
REPORT].
16. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, EMISSION OF GREEN-
HOUSE GASES IN THE UNITED STATES, 2007 (Dec. 2008), available at http://
www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ggrpt/index.html.
17. Id.
18. See Ray Purdy, The Legal Implications of Carbon Capture and Storage Under the
Sea, 7 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y 22, 22-23 (2006) (noting that the rise in atmos-
pheric concentrations of CO2 is "escalating in seriousness"); see also U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Current Evidence of Climate Change,
http://unfccc.int/essential-background/feeling-the-heat/items/2904.php (last visited
April 2, 2009).
19. U.S. ENVT. PROT. AGENCY (EPA), INVENTORY OF UNITED STATES GREEN-
HOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS, 1990-2006, ES-8 (2008), http://www.epa.gov/cli-
matechange/emissions/downloads/08_CR.pdf.
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from stationary power production sources are increasing more quickly
each year than emissions from other fossil fuel sources, including the
transportation sector.2" The Energy Information Administration in
2008 concluded that the electric power sector offered more cost-effective
opportunities to reduce CO 2 emissions, compared to the transportation
sector.21
Global CO 2 emissions are rising at the rate of approximately 10%
22per year. Within a century, if all nations of the world do not limit
GHG emissions, average global temperature will climb anywhere from
2.52' to 10.44°F (1.4' to 5.8°C).23 The IPCC Fourth Report in 2007
concluded that the evidence of human-made global warming is
"unequivocal." 24
Consider the context: for the past 10,000 years, Earth's temperature
has varied by less than 2°F (1.1 V°C). Global mean surface temperature
rose 1.33°F (0.74'C) over the last decade, and the rate of warming over
the past fifty years has almost doubled.25 Eleven of the past twelve years
have been among the warmest dozen years on record.26 At the height of
the last Ice Age, temperatures were only 5°C cooler than now. There-
fore, an increase of an additional five degrees is a major move. Such an
extreme 10.44°F (5.8'C) increase would not only lead to the starvation
of hundreds of millions of persons but also usher in the mass extinction
of half of the species on Earth.27
There are renewable energy alternatives. The amount of solar radia-
tion reflecting off Earth is about 1,000 times Earth's commercial energy
use.2' This means that converting about one or two percent of the
appropriate land area of Earth to utilize solar energy could satisfy much
20. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF INTEGRATED ANALYSIS & FORECASTING,
U.S. CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS FROM ENERGY SOuRcEs-2007 FLASH ESTIMATE 4
(May 2008), http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/flash/pdf/flash.pdf.
21. Charles Davis, Energy Estimates Show Rise in CO2 Emissions, Offer Mitigation
Options, CARBON CONTROL NEws, June 30, 2008, at 20.
22. Id.
23. IPCC, THIRD ASSESSMENT REPORT, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: SYNTHESIS
REPORT 13, 14 fig.5 (2001), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/tar/vol4/english/
pdf/wglspm.pdf. The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report talks of temperature increases of
a range between 2.4 and 6.4'C. This would yield a 7-23-inch rise in sea level during the
twenty-first century-a wide range. IPCC, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO
THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIs 13 (2007), available
at http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-wgl.htm [hereinafter IPCC GROUP I REPORT].
24. IPCC FOURTH SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 15, at 30.
25. IPCC GROUP I REPORT, supra note 23, at 237.
26. Id.
27. Jim Hansen, The Threat to the Planet, 53 N.Y. REv. BOOKS 12 (2006), availa-
ble at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/19131.
28. Jeffrey Sachs, Reinventing Energy, GuARDIAN, Apr. 22, 2008, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/apr/22/reinventingenergy.
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of Earth's electricity requirements when solar radiation is available. Stor-
ing that energy efficiently is another matter.2 9
B. The Canary in the Greenhouse Coal Mine
The early evidence is in. It is most visible in the ice sheets. The
Arctic is the world's "early-warning" system, warming at a rate twice that
of the rest of the world. 3° In the winter of 2004-05, a chunk of ice
equivalent in area to Turkey simply cracked and fell into the sea.3 1 At
the 2007 rate, the ice cap will disappear in less than a decade.
3 2
Scientists are concerned that warming has passed the critical tipping
point. As of the end of 2007, Greenland's ice sheet melted 19 billion
tons more than the previous high mark, and the volume of the Arctic Sea
ice at the end of summer 2007 was half of what it was four years earlier,
according to NASA satellite data.3 3 In 2006, scientists at the United
States' snow and date ice center projected that the Arctic sea ice might
melt entirely by 2040.3 4 One year later, in 2007, NASA climate scientist
Jay Zwally said: "At this rate, the Arctic Ocean could be nearly ice-free at
the end of summer by 2012, much faster than previous predictions."
35
"The Arctic is screaming," concluded Mark Serreze, senior scientist at the
government's snow and ice data center in Boulder.3' As noted by Al
Gore in accepting the Nobel Peace Prize:
Last September 21, as the Northern Hemisphere tilted away from
the sun, scientists reported with unprecedented distress that the
North Polar ice cap is "falling off a cliff." One study estimated
that it could be completely gone during summer in less than 22
years. Another new study, to be presented by U.S. Navy research-
ers later this week, warns it could happen in as little as 7 years.
37
29. See STEVEN FERREY, 1 THE LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER 20 (26th ed.
2008) (discussing electric energy storage options).
30. ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT, IMPACTS OF A WARMING ARCTIC 8
(2004), available at http://amap.no/workdocs/index.cfm?action=Getfile&dirsub=%2
FACIA%2Foverview&filename=ExecSummary.pdf&CFID=2632&CFTOKEN=BAAC
9858-1420-B7DF-365296F77179EC32&sort=default.
31. Johann Hari, Global Warming is Good News-For Oil Companies, INDEPEN-
DENT [LONDON], Nov. 6, 2006, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/
commentators/johann-hari/johann-hari-global-warming-is-good-news-for-oil-
companies-423165.html.
32. See Seth Borenstein, Associated Press, Ominous Arctic Melt Worries Experts,
Dec. 12, 2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/






37. Gore, supra note 5.
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The melting of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet-a massive block of ice
resting on the sea floor and protruding above the water line-would raise
the sea level by up to twenty feet. 38 The IPCC identifies melting ice
sheets that could lead to a rapid rise in sea levels and the extinction of
large numbers of species brought about by even moderate warming of
one to three degrees. 39 Even with modest warming, the Maldive Islands
could become the twenty-first-century Atlantis, submerging again into
the oceans.
C. The Future of Warming
The impacts on humans will be even more severe than the impacts
on polar ice and glaciers. As global warming raises the Earth's tempera-
ture, the corresponding increase in ocean temperature provides energy for
more forceful hurricanes. 40 Decreasing moisture availability with warmer
temperatures increases evapo-transpiration, reduces snowpack, and pro-
motes an earlier snowmelt.4 1 This has caused the U.S. fire season to
increase by seventy-eight days over the past twenty years. 42 Global
warming will reduce food production and crop yields in lower lati-
tudes, 43 and promote the rapid spread of infectious diseases and cardio-
vascular disease, while spurring competition for dwindling water
resources.
44
In 2007, the IPCC approved a summary report on the effects of
global warming, which noted particular impacts on water resources, food
production, ecosystems, and human health.45  A temperature rise of
5.4 0 F (30 C) would leave up to 30% of species facing extinction46 and
38. Thomas C. Schelling, Climate Change: The Uncertainties, the Certainties, and
What They Imply About Action, ECONOMISTS' VOICE, July 2007, at 4.
39. IPCC FOURTH SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 15, at 48, 52. The IPCC
2007 Report predicts that in the period 2007-2100, sea levels will rise by approximately
0.6-1.9 feet, also noting that such numbers may be increased by 3.9-7.8 inches if there is
a continuation of rapid polar ice melt. Id. at 45.
40. Stefan Rahmstorf et al., Hurricanes and Global Warming-Is There a Connec-
tion?, REAL CLIMATE, Sept. 2, 2005, http://www.realclimate.org/index.php?p=181 (argu-
ing that since warmer sea surface temperatures and instability in the lower atmosphere
created by them are the energy source for hurricanes, one may expect warmer waters to
lead to an increase in hurricane strength, such as Hurricane Katrina).
41. Anthony Westerling, Climatology for Wildfire Management, in THE ECONOM-
ICS OF FOREST DISTURBANCES: WILDFIRES, STORMS, AND INVASIVE SPECIES 107, 111
(Thomas P. Holmes et al. eds., 2008).
42. Envtl. Def. Fund, Global Warming by the Numbers (Aug. 30, 2007), http://
www.environmentaldefense.org/article.cfm?ContentlD=5816.
43. IPCC, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESS-
MENT REPORT: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY 11 (2007), available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-wg2.htm [hereinafter IPCC GROUP II REPORT].
44. Id. at 12.
45. Id. at 7.
46. Id. at 11.
2009]
326 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 23
would decimate the marine coral population.4 7 Food production and
crop yields would likely decrease in lower latitude areas, even if the global
temperature increase is small. Crop yields would likely increase in higher
latitudes, even if the temperature increase is between 1.80 to 5.4°F (10 to3°) 48
30 C).~
Higher temperatures will also increase the concentrations of
ground-level ozone, leading to a more rapid spread of infectious diseases
and cardiovascular disease.49 Competition for dwindling water resources
will be exacerbated. Forests will be increasingly affected by pests, disease,
and fire, with extended periods of high fire risks and large increases in
burned areas. 5° The sea level will rise and there will be more storm
surges on the coast.
At current rates of energy development, energy-related CO2 emis-
sions in 2050 will be 250% of their current levels. 5' Limiting global
warming to 4°F (2.22 0 C) would require stabilizing CO2 concentrations
at no more than 450 ppm. Current CO 2 concentrations are at about 385
ppm and rising. 52 A top official with the IPCC has indicated that devel-
oped nations will need to slash CO 2 emissions by 80-95%-almost
entirely-by 2050 to hold GHGs to 450 ppm in the atmosphere.
5 3
Deployment of renewable-energy generation bases will be required to
alter this trend.
III. CARBON REGULATION IN THE U.S. CIRcA 2009
The Rio Declaration was signed by 154 countries. 54 More than
175 countries eventually ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, with the
United States and Kazakhstan refusing to ratify the treaty. 55 Despite the
failure of the United States to join the Kyoto Protocol with other devel-
oped nations, there is vigorous carbon regulation in the United States.
47. Id. at 12.
48. Id. at 11.
49. Id. at 12.
50. Id. at 9.
51. INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY TECHNOLOGY PERSPECTIVES-SCENARIOS
AND STRATEGIES TO 2050 8 (2006).
52. Posting of Josh Patashnik to The New Republic Vine Blog, http://blogs.tnr.
com/tnr/blogs/environmentandenergy/archive/2008/04/24/co2-at-385-ppm-methane-
on-the-rise-too.aspx (Apr. 24, 2008, 12:14 PM).
53. Rick Mitchell, IPCC Official Says Industrialized Nations Must Cut Emissions Up
to 95 Percent, [2008] 39 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1917.
54. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declara-
tion on Environment and Development (June 14, 1992), available at http://www.un.org/
esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21 /index.htm.
55. See UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol Status of Ratification (rev. Jan. 14, 2009),
http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto-protocol/status-of ratification/application/pdf/kp-ratifica-
tion.pdf; see also Peter D. Cameron, History of Climate Change and Policy, in Watchman,
supra note 1, at 23, 35.
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Circa 2009, half of the states within the U.S. are individually or collec-
tively enacting carbon regulation.
There are two legislatively firm carbon reduction programs in the
United States: the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) program
involving ten Northeastern states-the first in the nation-commencing
in 2009,56 and the California carbon regulation, commencing in 2012 . 5
In addition, there are two other regional voluntary programs moving for-
ward: the Western Climate Initiative (WCI), involving seven states and
four Canadian provinces, and the Midwestern climate initiative, includ-
ing six participating states, three observing states, and a Canadian prov-
ince. 58 All together, these four looming carbon programs include about
half of the states.
This is the vanguard of American carbon regulation. This article
explores in detail the key regulatory choices on allocation and trading of
emission rights made in the two most-formed and visible U.S. carbon
programs, RGGI and California's carbon program. These decisions will
reallocate trillions of dollars of the U.S. economy and shape political
decision-making.
A. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative: The Eastern
Auction Initiative
1. The Basic Eastern Carbon Program
In April 2003, New York's Governor George Pataki invited neigh-
boring states to participate in a regional cap-and-trade emissions pro-
gram. In December 2005, seven states-Connecticut, Delaware, Maine,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and Vermont-entered into an
agreement to implement RGGI. 59 Since that time, Massachusetts, Mary-
land, and Rhode Island have signed the RGGI Memorandum of Under-
standing (RGGI Memorandum).6" The units covered include solely
56. See infra Part III.A.
57. See infra Part III.B.
58. See infra Part III.C.
59. Reg'l Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), Memorandum of Understanding 1
(Dec. 20, 2005), available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/mou final12-20-05.pdf [here-
inafter RGGI Memorandum].
60. See Press Release, State of Mass., Governor Patrick Signs Regional Pact to
Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Jan. 18, 2007), available at http://www.mass.gov/?
pagelD=Pressreleases&agld=Agov3&prModName=Gov3pressrelease&prFile=reduce_
greenhouse-gasesO11807.xml; Press Release, State of R-I., Lt. Gov. Roberts Calls for
Rhode Island to Join Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (Jan. 23, 2007), available at
http://www.ri.gov/press/view.php?id=3423 (declaring that in January 2007, Massachu-
setts and Rhode Island, respectively, would formally join RGGI as signatory states); see
also Press Release, State of Md., Governor O'Malley Takes Steps to Fight Global Warm-
ing, Climate Change in Maryland (Apr. 20, 2007), available at http://www.gov.state.md.
us/pressreleases/070420.html (declaring that Maryland, a predominantly coal-powered,
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"fossil fuel-fired electricity generating units having a rated capacity equal
to or greater than 25 megawatts. '"61
The market-based design of the RGGI Memorandum is a cap-and-
trade program. It only affects CO 2 emissions, not any of the other
GHGs. Cap-and-trade systems "operate by capping the amount of emis-
sions allowed, distributing emissions allowances to sources up to the cap,
and requiring each covered source to have sufficient allowances to cover
its emissions at the end of each compliance period."
6 2
The RGGI Staff Working Group (SWG) finalized the Draft Model
Rule (Model Rule) in January of 2007, contemplating individual partici-
pating state adoption of all controlling legal rules. The RGGI Memoran-
dum sets the start date for the program as January 2009.63 At that time,
CO 2 emissions from power plants in the region will be capped at current
levels64 and that stationary cap will remain in place until 2015. RGGI
states would then begin the process of incrementally reducing emissions,
with the goal of achieving a cumulative 10% reduction by 2019.65 By
2020, the program is expected to reach an emissions reduction of approx-
imately 35% from what would otherwise occur under business-as-
usual.66
Enforcement is a critical issue in any multistate effort. The penal-
ties for a generation facility falling short in RGGI allowances or offsets in
a given year do not involve a set alternative compliance fee payment, as
does the typical market in renewable energy credits in the U.S., where
cash is as good as compliance. For RGGI allowance shortfall, enforce-
ment actions could be undertaken under the Title V operating permit
requirements of the Clean Air Act, where civil penalties could exceed
$30,000 per day per violation.6 7 Violators would also be subject to crim-
inal penalties.
68
electricity-generating state, in contrast to the other RGGI states, would join RGGI in
2006).
61. RGGI Memorandum, supra note 59, at 2.
62. Edna Sussman, New York Addresses Climate Change With the First Mandatory
U.S. Greenhouse Gas Program, N.Y. ST. B.J., May 2006, at 43, 44.
63. RGGI Memorandum, supra note 59, at 2.
64. Id. The regional base annual CO 2 emissions cap will be equal to approxi-
mately 121 million short tons.
65. Press Release, Reg'l Greenhouse Gas Initiative, States Reach Agreement on
Proposed Rules for the Nation's First Cap-and-Trade Program to Address Climate
Change 2 (Aug. 15, 2006), http://www.rggi.org/docs/model rule-release_8-15-06.pdf.
66. Id.
67. See EPA, Clean Air Act National Enforcement Programs, http://www.epa.gov/
compliance/civil/caa/caaenfprog.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
68. See EPA, Criminal Enforcement, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/criminal/
index.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2009) (demonstrating that the EPA has the ability to
bring criminal charges for violations).
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The Model Rule indicates that when a regulated entity's emissions
exceed its CO 2 allowance budget, the state can deduct from the entity's
compliance account future allowances (beyond the current control
period) equal to three times the number of the entity's excess emis-
sions. 6 9 If the regulated entity has insufficient CO 2 allowances to cover
three times that amount, it must immediately thereafter transfer suffi-
cient allowances into its compliance account.7 ' This treble penalties
scheme (3:1 loss of allowances) raises interesting challenges to the ability
to obtain sufficient allowances when they will only be auctioned periodi-
cally by the issuing states.
2. Auction Versus Allocation of Allowances
Actual RGGI distribution of allowances will not mirror RGGI dis-
tribution of allowances as designed and promulgated. Importantly, the
RGGI scheme as originally designed for the ten states contemplated that
allowances to emit CO 2 would be allocated without cost to emission
sources: "CO 2 emission allowances will be allocated to, and traded
among, fossil fuel-fired electricity generators within the region that sup-
ply electricity to the grid."'7 1 The RGGI Model Rule requires that each
state reserve a minimum of 25% of that state's allowances for auction
and the use of proceeds for "consumer benefit or strategic energy
purpose[s]."72
Depending on the market for allowances, after auction some states
could have hundreds of millions of dollars in an open-ended fund.73 Use
of the funds could range from using the money to actually defer con-
sumer electricity bills or funding state-run energy efficiency programs to
putting the money back into the state coffers. The proceeds will be used
for energy efficiency in percentages ranging from 70% in Connecticut to
100% in Vermont. 74 The EIA documents that New England already has
the country's highest electricity rates, with Connecticut having the high-
est rates in the continental U.S. 75 New Hampshire will return amounts
over $6/ton to consumers and Connecticut's governor plans to return a
69. RGGI, MODEL RULE § 6.5(d)(1) (Jan. 5, 2007), http://www.rggi.org/docs/
model rule-corrected.l_5_07.pdf.
70. Id
71. Heddy Bolster, Note, The Commerce Clause Meets Environmental Protection:
The Compensatory Tax Doctrine as a Defense of Potential Regional Carbon Dioxide Regula-
tion, 47 B.C. L. REv. 737, 744 (2006) (citing RGGI Memorandum, supra note 59, at 2).
72. RGGI, MODEL RULE, supra note 69, § 6.5(d)(1).
73. Steven Ferrey, Corporate Responsibility and Carbon-Based Life Forms, 35 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 419, 434 (2008).
74. See Environmental Northeast, RGGI Allowance Allocations & Use of Auction
Proceeds (Mar. 24, 2009), http:/lusclimatenetwork.orgresource-database/ENEAuction_
Tracker_Full_3.25_09.pdf/at download/file.
75. Lisa Wood, RGGI Effect Goes Beyond Mandates, Brings Wave of Changes to New
England Energy Policy, PLAT-rs ELEC. UTIL. WK., Sept. 1, 2008, at 1, 11.
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percentage of revenues above $5/ton to consumers as rebates, even
though the Connecticut Attorney General has determined this illegal
under state law.7
6
Most RGGI states, including Maine, 77 Massachusetts, 78 Vermont,79
and New York,8 ° have adopted uniform rules to implement the RGGI
program, announcing that 100% of their allowances will be auctioned.
The states are electing to auction different quantities of their allowances,
with all of the New England states except Connecticut and New Hamp-
shire effectively at 100%, Connecticut at 77%, and Maryland undecided.
These states have realized that instead of allowing the value of "freely"
allocated allowances to affect the price at Which electricity is sold-
thereby giving power producers the windfall-the state could capture the
windfall by auctioning all of the allowances, simultaneously requiring
that the proceeds be directed toward public benefits."s
76. Id.
77. An Act to Establish the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Act of 2007, ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 580 et seq. (2007). Maine's Regional Greenhouse Gas Initia-
tive Act of 2007 (LD 1851) was passed by the Maine Legislature and enacted June 18,
2007; see State of Maine Legislature, Summary of LD 1851, http://janus.state.me.us/
legis/LawMakerWeb/summary.asp?ID=280024997 (last visited April 2, 2009).
78. 310 MAss. CODE REGS. § 7.00 app. B & § 7.29 (2007).
79. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 255 (2007). Vermont receives the majority of its
power from Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant and Hydro-Quebec, two power pro-
ducers with very low carbon output. Since Vermont will still have a significant amount of
allowances allotted to it, the state could end up selling the allowances to out-of-state
power producers.
80. See generally N.Y. MODEL RULE pt. 242 (Proposed Official Draft 2006), http:/
/www.dec.ny.gov/docs/airpdf/part242draft.pdf (proposing a rule to implement the
RGGI initiative in New York).
81. Id. § 242-5.3(a). The proceeds from this auction will then be used for "energy
efficiency, renewable or non-carbon-emitting technologies, and/or innovative carbon
emissions abatement technologies with significant carbon reduction potential." Id. This
account will be managed by either the New York Department of Environmental Conser-
vation (DEC) or an agent assigned by the DEC. Id.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 255 (2007) indicates that 100% of the CO2 allowances in
that state will be auctioned and the proceeds from the sale will be allocated to one or
more trustees acting on behalf of consumers. The account will be managed by trustees,
appointed by the Public Service Board, to provide the maximum long-term benefit to
Vermont electric consumers. Auction goals and procedures are also loosely outlined in
New York's draft rule; see N.Y. MODEL RULE, supra note 80, pt. 242-5.3(a). The DEC
envisions an "open and transparent allowance auction," which will be held once each
year. Other stated objectives of the DEC include creating a liquid allowance market by
minimizing entry and exit barriers, allowing any financially qualified individuals or enti-
ties to bid on allowances, and designing the system so as to not act as a barrier to invest-
ment in new generating facilities. N.Y. MODEL RULE pt. 24 2-5.3(a); see also ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 580B(7) (2007) (requiring the Department of Environmental Pro-
tection to allocate 100% of the annual CO 2 emissions allowances for public benefit to
produce funds for carbon reduction and energy conservation).
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It is unprecedented in U.S. environmental regulation that the allo-
cations for emissions are auctioned to pre-existing, operating emission
sources.8 2 Power producers lobbied states to auction only the twenty-five
percent designated minimum amount of allowances and to allocate the
remaining shares to power producers based on their historical or future
energy production levels, without charging for these allocations.8 3 Forc-
ing power producers to pay for all of their allowances for pre-existing
emissions could also create a competitive price disadvantage for in-state
producers, if neighboring RGGI states' generators are given some or the
majority of allowances without charge or do not similarly regulate GHGs
from power plants.
Power producers also expressed their concerns regarding how this
new carbon expense will affect their pre-existing long-term power con-
tracts.84 The cost of future CO 2 allowances was not factored into any of
these existing contracts; generators producing under these long-term
deals fear that they will not be able to adjust the contract price to account
for such new regulatory carbon costs. 85 Whether the power purchase
agreement allows pass-through price adjustments will depend on individ-
ual contracts.
The RGGI sealed bid auction transpires quarterly in 1,000 allow-
ance increments by vintage of the allowance.8 6 A buyer can purchase up
to four years into the future, if state law permits it. The initial reserve
(minimum) price is set at $1.86 per allowance for the first auction, and
the price increases in the future with the consumer price index.8 7 Unsold
allowances can be carried forward for sale offering in subsequent auc-
82. Roman Kramarchuk, All-Out Auctions?, ENVTL. FIN., Mar. 2007, at 45, http:/
/www.environmentalmarkets.org/galleries/default-file/Kramarchuk%20ef3marketview-
p45.pdf (noting that the EPA auctions only one percent of total sulfur dioxide
allowances, and that this percentage does not include any auction to preexisting sources,
which are freely allocated to electric power generators).
83. One power producer, National Grid, has advocated auctioning 100% of the
allowances and then having the state use the money to supplement consumer rates.
These generators propose that the costs spent on allowances by the utilities will be passed
along to the consumer, resulting in higher retail prices for consumers. Nat'l Grid, RGGI,
NHDES Stakeholders Meeting (Dec. 14, 2006), http://www.des.state.nh.us/ard/cli-
matechange/docs/NationalGrid.ppt.
84. RGGI, Draft Meeting Summary of Regional Stakeholder Meeting (May 2,
2006), http://www.rggi.org/docs/stakeholder-meeting-summary-5-2-06.pdf.
85. Id.
86. RGGI, Design Elements for Regional Allowance Auctions Under the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (Mar. 17, 2008), http://www.rggi.org/docs/20080317auc-
tion-design.pdf; see also Gerald Silverman, Regional Initiative Sets Terms, Dates for First
Carbon Emissions Auctions, [2008] 39 Env't Rep. (BNA) 549 (stating that the first auction
will take place in September 2008, and the second in December 2008).
87. Silverman, supra note 86, at 549.
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tions.8 8 An elaborate monitoring and administrative system must be
established to make this work.
In addition, RGGI states have elected to allow anyone to purchase
allowances through the auction.8 9 This could be out-of-state power pro-
ducers seeking RGGI allowances fungible in their states of residence,
competitors wanting to keep allowances away from their competition,
environmental organizations, speculators, marketers, or others. Any bid-
der could purchase up to one-quarter of available allowances at a given
auction cycle. 9° Under this scenario, in theory, existing electric power
plants emitting carbon during their operations may not be successful bid-
ders for these allowances and therefore could be short of the necessary
allowances to continue operations.
Fifty-nine bidders participated in the first RGGI auction.9" The
WCI Western states for their carbon regulation recommended that
between 25 and 75% of total emission allowances be auctioned rather
than allocated for free.92 WCI would cover 90% of regional GHG emis-
sions,93 and the auction of allowances also would be a state determina-
tion, with at least 10% WCI auction.
Maine is proposing to use RGGI auction revenues for subsidizing
energy expenditures by low-income persons rather than energy efficiency,
as is New Jersey.94 The U.N. Foundation has recommended against any
revenues raised from the auction of cap-and-trade carbon allowances
being devoted to low-income assistance programs because that supports
use of fossil fuels in energy-inefficient homes instead of offering long-
term investment in more efficient or lower-carbon use of energy.
95
California's response to auction allocation is discussed in Part III.B
below.96
88. Id.
89. See Mass. Dep't Envtl. Prot., Frequently Asked Questions: Regional Green-
house Gas Initiative (RGGI), http://www.mass.gov/dep/air/climate/rggifaq.htm (last vis-
ited Apr. 2, 2009) (indicating that a secondary market of investment purchase is
contemplated).
90. Id.
91. Lisa Wood & Mary Powers, RGGIAuction to Provide Big Financial Infision for
Utilities' Customer Program, PAIrrs ELEC. UTIL. WK., Oct. 6, 2008, at 2.
92. Carolyn Whetzel, Western States Release Draft Policies for Allocating Emissions
Allowances, [2008] 39 Env't Rep. (BNA) 702.
93. Carolyn Whetzel, Western Climate Initiative Issue Final Plan for Multi-Sector
Cap-and-Trade Program, [2008] 39 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1914.
94. Wood & Powers, supra note 91, at 19.
95. Curt Barry, Expert Questions Diverting Carbon Revenue to Low-Income Aid Pro-
grams, CARBON CONTROL NEWS, Sept. 22, 2008, at 22.
96. See infra Part III.B.
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3. Additional Offsets Created
Because the price of obtaining necessary allowances could be high,
RGGI also created an offsets program to offer power producers flexible
alternative credits in meeting the cap limitations. "Offsets" under RGGI
are emissions reductions that come from sources other than fossil-fuel-
fired electricity generators that are subject to the emissions cap under
RGGI. The offsets program awards offset allowances for approved offset
projects that were realized on or after the date of the Memorandum. 97
Power producers can use up to a specified percentage of carbon offset
allowances to comply with the cap requirements.
The initially allowed offset projects that can be approved under the
offsets program include: (1) landfill methane capture and combustion;
(2) sulfur hexafluoride (SF 6) capture and recycling; (3) afforestation
(transition of land from a non-forested to forested state); (4) end-use
efficiency for natural gas, propane, and heating oil; (5) methane capture
from farming operations; and (6) projects to reduce fugitive methane
emissions from natural gas transmission and distribution.98 Even if a
project would fit into one of these six categories, no offset credit will be
allowed if it has an electric generation component, unless the project
sponsor transfers legal rights to the credits to the regulatory agency. 99
The Model Rule disallows offset allowances for any offset project that
receives funding or other incentives from renewable energy trust funds"' °
or any credits or allowances that would be earned from any other
mandatory or voluntary GHG programs.11 No credits can be awarded
for projects that are required by any local, state, or federal law, regula-
tion, or administrative or judicial order.1 °2 RGGI offset credits have a
lifetime of ten years, with the possibility of renewal; afforestation projects
create credits with a twenty-year lifetime, with a possible renewal up to
sixty years.10
3
To ensure that the majority of the emissions reductions occurs
within the power production sector, the Memorandum of Understanding
places limits on the use of offsets and the issuance of additional offsets to
moderate high offset price impacts. 0 4 Where the price of allowance
trades increases above set circuit-breaker levels, it increases the potential
sources and percentages of offsets that can be used by power projects in
lieu of purchased allowances. In particular, RGGI initially allows offset
97. RGGI Memorandum, supra note 59, at 4.
98. Id.
99. RGGI, MODEL RULE, supra note 69, § 6.5(d)(1).
100. Id. § 10.3(d)(3).
101. Id. § 10.3(d)(4).
102. Id § 10.3(d)(1).
103. Id. § 10.3(e)(2).
104. RGGI, Memorandum of Understanding in Brief (Dec. 12, 2005), http://
www.rggi.org/docs/mou-brief 12_20_05.pdf.
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projects anywhere in the U.S. if the average price of an emission allow-
ance remains below $7 per ton. 10 5 In each compliance period, each gen-
erator will be allowed to cover up to 3.3% of its emissions using offset
allowances, which is roughly equal to half of that generator's emissions
reduction obligation by 2018. '06 Therefore, some of the carbon reduc-
tion would have to come from actual reductions at the facility.
If allowance prices rise above $10 per ton, RGGI will allow sources
to cover up to 10% of their emissions with offsets and will allow offset
projects outside the U.S. as well as allowances from the E.U. Emissions
Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) and the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM).' 0 7 This would allow the full, required reduction to
come from purchasing offsets on the market, rather than making actual
reductions at the generation facility. If allowance prices rise above $10
per ton, then the compliance period will be extended by one year, for a
maximum compliance period of four years.10 8 This mechanism will give
sources more time to reduce their emissions and may permit allowance
prices to fall.
The purpose of these "circuit breaker" provisions is to effectively
suspend the rules of the program during those periods when the market-
based cap-and-trade system results in trading allowances at politically
controversial prices. In other words, when the market works to reflect a
short supply of allowances, the definition of what can be counted and
traded, both in geographic and percentage dimensions, is liberalized to
allow regulated entities greater flexibility to document compliance.
The decision to include EU-ETS and Kyoto CDM project credits as
eligible currency is curious. Because EU-ETS allowances are given away
without charge by E.U. countries to their industries as part of the politi-
cal process,'0 9 this eligibility effectively would work as an income and
welfare shift from U.S. power generation owners to E.U. industries.
Moreover, in light of the overestimation of Kyoto CDM offsets,' 10 there
are interesting implications for verification within the RGGI system.
RGGI allows offsets to satisfy between 3.3 and 10% of compliance
obligations. This may seem minor until one realizes that RGGI requires
no state reduction in carbon between 2009 and 2015, and then a cumu-
lative 10% reduction thereafter by 2018. Therefore, offsets could supply
105. Id.
106. RGGI Memorandum, supra note 59, at 5.
107. See Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change, Response to "Design Elements of a
Mandatory Market-Based Greenhouse Gas Regulatory System" (2006), http://
www.pewclimate.org/policy-center/analyses/sec/q3.cfm (noting that the Kyoto Protocol
may affect who can accept RGGI credits, since the U.S. is not a party to the protocol).
108. Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change, Q&A: Regional Greenhouse Gas Initi-
ative (2007), http://www.pewclimate.org/rggi/qanda.
109. See infra Part IV.B.
110. Purdy, supra note 18, at 23-24.
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most or all of the RGGI compliance obligations over the next decade,
rather than reductions at the regulated facilities.
According to one industry source, offsets are a "main avenue of
compliance," because there is little that can be done at existing regulated
fossil-fuel-fired facilities to control CO 2 emissions. 1 1' There could be
some arbitrage, as any offset project would have to be registered in just
one RGGI state, and then could, if a Memorandum of Understanding is
in place, be traded into another RGGI state. The flexibility of different
RGGI states in registration of offset projects under local state rules could
vary.
B. California Carbon Regulation: The Allocation Battle
1. The Basic Western Carbon Program
California is the twelfth-largest GHG producer in the world.112
California's landmark legislation established a comprehensive program of
regulatory and market mechanisms with the goal of achieving cost-effec-
tive and quantifiable GHG emissions reductions. Pursuant to the Cali-
fornia Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (commonly referred to as
Assembly Bill 32 or AB 32), the state is required to reduce its aggregate
GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2020.113 This equates to an eventual
estimated 25% reduction from forecast business-as-usual levels." 4 AB
32 charges the California Air Resources Board (CARB) with the respon-
sibility for developing and implementing a plan to meet this challenging
emissions-reduction goal. CARB is directed by statute with, inter alia,
the responsibility to evaluate several factors prior to imposing mandates,
including impacts on California's economy, equity between regulated
entities, electricity reliability, and whether the rules will disproportion-
ately impact low-income communities.' 15
AB 32 specifically recognizes that a market-based system can be
used in conjunction with regulatory and other strategies to meet Califor-
nia's economy-wide goal of reducing emissions. To assist CARB in fulfil-
ling its charge, the Governor directed the creation of the Market
Advisory Committee (MAC) to advise CARB on the development of a
111. RGGI Officials Facing Unresolved Questions Over Offiet Project Policy, CARBON
CONTROL NEws, Aug. 18, 2008, at 7, 7-8 [hereinafter Unresolved Questions].
112. Cal. Energy Comm'n & Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Proposed Final Opinion
Summary on Greenhouse Gas Regulatory Strategies 2 (Sept. 2008) [hereinafter Green-
house Gas Regulatory Strategies].
113. Michael J. Bradley & Assocs., Climate Change Briefing, Summary: California
Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (Aug. 2006), http://www.mjbradley.com/
briefingspecialab32.html.
114. Id.
115. Cal. Air Res. Bd., AB 32 Fact Sheet-California Global Warming Solutions
Act of 2006 (Sept. 25, 2006), http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/factsheets/ab32factsheet.pdf.
2009]
336 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 23
statewide plan to reduce GHG emissions' 1 6 and to design a mandatory
cap-and-trade program to achieve cost-effective emissions cuts across all
sectors. 117
MAC's Final Report includes several important recommendations.
First, the California cap-and-trade program should eventually incorpo-
rate all major GHG-emitting sectors in the state. The greatest attention
should be given to the electricity, industry, buildings, and transportation
sectors as the main contributors of emissions.'' 8
The California scheme covers all electric retail load-serving entities
(LSEs), including municipal LSEs." 9 Electric generators are required to
meet a CO 2 emissions level no greater than that achievable by a com-
bined-cycle gas-fired generator. 120 Any new contracts for a term of five
years or more for the procurement of baseload generation must comply
with performance standards of emitting no more than 1100 lbs. CO
MWh of power generation. 21 "Baseload" generation is defined as gener-
ation that is designed and intended to operate at an annualized capacity
factor of 60% or greater.' 22
Roughly one-half of California's electric sector GHG emissions are
the result of electric power imports from out-of-state that stem predomi-
116. Press Release, Cal. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Expert Advisors Release Final Cap-
and-Trade Report (June 29, 2007), http://www.calepa.ca.gov/PressRoom/Releases/2007/
PR12-062907.pdf [hereinafter Cal. EPA Press Release].
117. MARKET ADvISORY COMM. TO THE CAL. AIR RES. BD., RECOMMENDA-
TIONS FOR DESIGNING A GREENHOUSE GAS CAP-AND-TRADE SYSTEM FOR CALIFORNIA
iii (June 30, 2007), http://www.climatechange.ca.gov/publications/market-advisory-
committee/2007-06-29_MACFINALREPORT.PDF.
118. Id. at iv.
119. See Seth Hilton, The Impact of California ' Global Warming Legislation on the
Electric Utility Industry, 19 ELEC. J. 9, 12 (2006). California is home to the largest
municipal utility in the nation, the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power
(LADWP), serving a multi-million person consumer base. LADWP is among the most
dependent California LSEs on both power imports from out of state and coal-fired high-
GHG power.
120. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 8340-41 (2007). This legislation targets only
electric generation. Sections 8340 and 8341 govern all new long-term energy commit-
ments and establish a "greenhouse gas emissions performance standard." This is specific
to the electric power role in meeting AB 32 goals. The GHG emissions standard creates a
specific level of permissible emissions and prohibits new construction, new long-term
power contracts, and any major plant investment that will not meet the performance
standard. This prohibits load serving entities from entering long-term power contracts
with out-of-state producers who do not meet California's stringent new emissions stan-
dard. California's Public Utilities Commission (PUC) has set the GHG emissions per-
formance standard at the equivalent of the emissions from a combined-cycle natural gas
plant.
121. Id; see Hilton, supra note 119, at 14 (indicating that the California emissions
levels set a target that conventional coal-fired electric generation plants will not be able to
meet, as they generate about 1770 lbs. CO 2/MWh).
122. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 8340-41 (2007).
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nately from coal-fired power plants. 1 23 Imported electricity contributes
more GHG emissions than electricity produced in California, 1 24 even
though 78% of electricity is produced in-state.1 25 California's new emis-
sions limitations will thus significantly restrict the attractiveness of coal-
fired generation for California. While California has little in-state coal
generation, various California LSEs, particularly the Los Angeles Depart-
ment of Water and Power, import significant coal-fired power from vari-
ous other states.1 26 This legislation will have a significant impact on
such LSEs.
Pursuant to AB 32, utilities are required to "[a]ccount for green-
house gas emissions from all electricity consumed in the state, including
transmission and distribution line losses from electricity generated within
the state or imported from outside the state."127 The California scheme,
by regulating all California LSEs including municipal utilities, impacts all
in-state and out-of-state generation used to serve California's electric
load.128
123. Order Instituting Rulemaking to Implement the Commission's Procurement
Incentive Framework and to Examine the Integration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Stan-
dards Into Procurement Policies, No. 06-04-009, D. 07-09-017, 2007 WL 2579525, at
*3 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n Sept. 6, 2007). Three-quarters of California's power
imports come from the Southwest and involve much coal-fired power, as opposed to the
other quarter that is imported through the Northwest. AL ALVARADO & KAREN GiF-
FIN, CAL. ENERGY COMM'N, REVISED METHODOLOGY TO ESTIMATE THE GENERATION
RESOURCE MIx OF CALIFORNIA ELECTRICITY IMPORTS: UPDATE TO THE MAY 2006
STAFF PAPER 1 (Apr. 12, 2007), http://www.energy.ca.gov/2007publications/CEC-700-
2007-007/CEC-700-2007-007.PDF.
124. Greenhouse Gas Regulatory Strategies, supra note 112, at 2 fig.1.
125. Id. at 3. The percentage of imported electricity GHGs compared to in-state
electricity has ranged from 39-57% recently.
126. Hilton, supra note 119, at 13. The three major investor-owned utilities
import 3-15% of their total supply in the form of out-of-state coal-fired power. The Los
Angeles DWP imports half of its power from these sources.
127. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38530(b)(2) (2007) ("This requirement
applies to all retail sellers of electricity, including load-serving entities as defined in subdi-
vision (j) of Section 380 of the Public Utilities Code and local publicly owned electric
utilities as defined in Section 964 of the Public Utilities Code.").
128. The bill sets a firm limit on GHG emissions in California by requiring the
Air Resources Board to determine California's GHG emission level in 1990 and then
issue regulations causing GHG emissions to be reduced to that level by 2020. AB 32 also
requires comprehensive GHG reporting by major sources of GHG emissions. Market-
based compliance mechanisms are also discussed in the legislation, but are left to the
discretion of the Air Resources Board. While this regulates all significant sources of
GHGs, because electric power production accounts for about 20% of GHG emissions in
California, electric generation has become the primary target for regulation. This scheme
can be contrasted with RGGI, which only regulates CO2 emissions within the electric
power sector, and then only focuses on part of that sector.
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2. Allocation Versus Auction of California Allowances
MAC concluded that the cap-and-trade program should use a
hybrid approach with regard to the distribution of carbon emission
allowances, freely allocating some share of allowances and auctioning the
other share of allowances. The percentage of allowances auctioned would
increase over time.' 29 MAC encourages the state to retain flexibility to
freely allocate some of the allowances in a manner that stabilizes the price
impacts and manages competitiveness among California power produc-
ers. 13 ° Free allocation of allowances should be determined by environ-
mental performance standards, and the auction should be designed to
promote voluntary early reductions."'
In addition, MAC concluded that the California cap-and-trade pro-
gram should recognize offsets generated by sources within and outside of
California's borders. 132 The inclusion of emission reductions by sources
not typically covered in the traditional program can be used to reduce
costs and help meet the 2020 emissions reduction target. MAC recom-
mended the use of stringent criteria to ensure the quality of the approved
offsets projects. 133
California is considering allowing RECs to also count for carbon
reduction. 1 34 This is actually the opposite of what RGGI allows. Some
activists are trying to limit out-of-state offset credits for out-of-California
renewable energy project offsets. 135 Southern California utilities are urg-
ing no restriction on out-of-state renewable energy credits. 1 36 The MAC
recommendations represent a significant departure from the original stat-
utory scheme. A California legislative committee advanced legislation
that would require sellers of offsets to hire independent third-party verifi-
cation to ensure that offsets are legitimate and meet state protocols and
requirements. 13
7
129. Cal. EPA Press Release, supra note 116, at 2.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See LAWRENCE H. GOULDER, CAP-AND-TRADE DESIGN: MAC RECOMMEN-
DATIONS AND OTHER ISSUES (2006), http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/meetings/
5_28notice/presentations/goulder.5_28.pdf; Cal. EPA Press Release, supra note 116, at
2.
133. See GOULDER, supra note 132; see also Cal. EPA Press Release, supra note
116, at 2 (recommending "the use of rigorous criteria to ensure high-quality offsets").
134. Montana Inaction on GHGs Signals Trouble for Regional Trading Plan, CAR-
BON CONTROL NEWS, Sept. 29, 2008, at 7.
135. Utility Argues Renewable Credit Trading Key to California GHG Cuts, CARBON
CONTROL NEWS, Sept. 29, 2008, at 3.
136. Id.
137. California Lawmakers Advance Bill Requiring GHG Offiet Verification, CAR-
BON CONTROL NEWS, Apr. 21, 2008, available at http://carboncontrolnews.com/index.
php/ccn/show/california lawmakers advancebill-requiringghgoffsetverification/
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After the MAC recommendation, CARB and the California Public
Utilities Commission (CPUC) also favored a gradual approach to auc-
tioning allowances, with the auction percentage increasing over time.1 38
California's Energy Commission and CPUC jointly proposed that the
state phase in the auction of allowances over a five-year period until
2016, returning most of the money from auctioning allowances to utility
ratepayers.' 39 If auction revenues are returned to consumers as rebates
for higher electricity costs, this paradigm is often called "cap-and-divi-
dend." They initially recommended free allocation of 80% of allowances
in 2012, based on proportional historical emissions by fuel rather than
amount of electric sales; 20% of allowances would be auctioned, and
with an increase in auctions of 20% annually, there would be a total
auction by 2016.140 This allocation would initially hold higher-carbon
sources harmless. Environmental groups had wanted immediate total
auction with the proceeds devoted to state GHG programs. 4 '
In California, the Energy Commission is looking for 50% of carbon
emissions cuts to come from the electric utility sector, even though it is
responsible in California for less than one-quarter of all carbon emis-
sions. 14 2 California's initial free allocation of 80% of all allowances
would be based on historic energy output and type of fuel source, thus
cushioning higher-carbon providers of electricity.143 California would
allow unlimited use of offsets for any amount of compliance.14 4 This is
in contrast to RGGI, where only 3.3% use of offsets is allowed. The
head of the LADWP still characterized auction of allowances as a wealth
transfer from certain higher-carbon utilities to others.1
45
LADWP criticized the recommendation of the CPUC to CARB to
base allowance allocation on gross sales, irrespective of fuels used and
generating mix, as taking funds from certain areas of the state and reallo-
cating them to GHG-reduction efforts that may not benefit those who
paid these amounts.146 It also criticized the position of other investor-
(discussing AB 1851, authored by Assemblyman Pedro Nava and approved by the Cali-
fornia Natural Resources Committee).
138. California Air Resources Board Issues Long-Awaited GHG Plan, Pi.Arrs ELEC.
UTIL. WK., June 27, 2008, at 14, 15.
139. Greenhouse Gas Regulatory Strategies, supra note 112, at 11.
140. Id. at 10-11.
141. California Proposes to Phase in GHG Auctions to Lower Utility Costs, CARBON
CONTROL NEWS, Sept. 15, 2008, available at http://carboncontrolnews.com/index.php/
ccn/show/california-proposesto-phasejin-ghgauctions to-lower_utility-costs/.
142. Lisa Weinzimer & Christine Cordner, California Energy Agencies Support
Transition to Carbon Allowance Auction Over Five Years, PiATrs ELEC. UTIL. WK., Sept.




146. LADWP, Reply Comments on Proposed Decision of Commissioner Peevey:
Final Opinion on Greenhouse Gas Regulatory Strategies 3 (Oct. 7, 2008).
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owned utilities to support the effect of a cap-and-trade allowance auction
system to "true-up" the costs of more coal-sourced electric utility rates
with those of other investor-owned utilities.
1 47
Offsets would be permitted with unlimited banking of offsets, and
allowances with no geographic limitations on their origination, and the
program would bilaterally link to the WCI regional plan. 148  There
would be no price trigger protections as in RGGI. 149 The legislature has
the final determination of auction.
This set of choices in California is fundamentally and legally dis-
tinct from its predecessor RGGI states, commencing three years prior.
First, they differ on auction versus free allocation along with the support-
ing rationales. Second, they differ in whether they attempt to immedi-
ately increase the cost of generation to high-carbon generation sources, or
accommodate historic emissions. Third, they differ on geographic limi-
tation on offsets from outside the region. Fourth, they differ on price
triggers on allowed percentage acquisition of offsets. Fifth, they differ in
limitations imposed on point of origin of offsets. California recommen-
dations for program design do not engage in constitutionally suspect
point of origin discrimination or immediate torquing of wholesale power
pricing. California Governor Schwarzenegger, one of the most stalwart
advocates for carbon regulation, moved in early 2009 to ease green power
regulations because of California's economic downturn.
150
3. The Auction Battle
Major fights erupted in California over the allocation or auction of
CO 2 emission allowances. 151 These fights included if GHG allowances
are dispersed without charge to load-serving entities, and whether the
traditional number of customers served or the traditional level of emis-
sions from such service should constitute the basis for allowance distribu-
tion.152 If, to the contrary, allowances are auctioned, there is a major
dispute as to whether this additional cost disadvantages those LSEs who
serve the poorest consumer segment, and by whom and how the massive
revenues from such auctions will be utilized. The billion-dollar pot of
147. LADWP, Opening Comments of LADWP on the Proposed Decision of
President Peevey: Interim Opinion on Greenhouse Gas Regulatory Strategies 8 (Feb. 28,
2008).
148. Greenhouse Gas Regulatory Strategies, supra note 112, at 13.
149. Id.
150. Lisa Weinzimer, Schwarzenegger Presses for Easing Green Regulations to Head
Off Financial Crisis, PA-rrs ELEC. UTIL. WK., Jan. 12, 2009, at 15.
151. Divisions Deepen in Califrnia Over GHG Emission-Allowance Plan, CARBON
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gold from such auctions caused dispute as to whether it should be dis-
tributed back to the retail power consumers who will pay higher power
prices if allowances are auctioned, rather than used for government
projects, or employed as a welfare program supplement.153 The rebate of
carbon auction revenues to poor consumers, to offset some of the higher
cost of electric power incorporating carbon auction prices, is criticized by
Robert Repetto of the U.N. Foundation, yet favored by Resources for the
Future.' 
54
The investor-owned California utilities, in comments in May 2008,
urged California to allocate to all emission sources based on traditional
power output, rather than emissions output, employing a uniform GHG
baseline. 55 This would favor the award of allowances to less carbon-
intensive sources and utilities. Surplus allowances could be sold.
Pacific Gas & Electric Company argued that the allowances should
be awarded to utilities, with the revenues earned by utilities that sell sur-
plus allowances through private auctions or sales returned directly to util-
ity ratepayers, or for programs that help such consumers, "who ultimately
bear the costs of the program."'156 Sempra Energy Utilities, the electric
and gas distribution utility in the greater San Diego area, has questioned
the legality of auctioning allowances if the resulting revenues are returned
to the state general fund, reasoning that it was an executive-branch-
authorized tax in the guise of carbon regulation.' 57 Dynegy and other
independent power producers (IPPs) in California that operate higher-
carbon sources of independent power supply submitted that allowances
should be distributed without charge based on historic emissions levels,
rather than power output, to "recognize the reliability benefits conferred
by such sources" and the "loss of market value of these resources."158
The Los Angeles Department of Water and Power filed comments
to the California energy regulatory agencies in later 2008, stating that
there needed to be a rehearing on legal issues associated with carbon
regulation, including whether auction of allowances creates a tax in viola-
tion of California Proposition 13, which tax is differentially applied to
utilities as compared to other businesses in violation of the state constitu-
tion; violates home rule authority of the City pursuant to state law; and
unconstitutionally transfers funds from utility providers, by means of a
forced regulatory gift.' 59 Under the auction scheme, utilities that used
their ratepayers' monies to acquire needed allowances at auction would
153. Id
154. Barry, supra note 95.




159. Request for Rehearing/Reconsideration of the Los Angeles Department of
Water and Power on Final Opinion on Greenhouse Gas Regulatory Strategies, No. 06-
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not see those funds devoted to projects that directly credited or benefited
those ratepayers. 6 0
Environmental groups, however, fought any allocation without
charge to LSEs that could favor more allowances for higher-emitting util-
ities. Environmental groups charge that any allocation based on historic-
emissions "grandfathering" "rewards pollution, penalizes early action,
and can also result in windfall profits at the expense of consumers.
' 16 t
They charge that because California power generation is cleaner per unit
of generated power than the national average, if federal carbon legislation
were to similarly "grandfather" allocation based on historic emissions
levels, "California and its clean utilities and its consumers will be
losers." 162 The environmental groups also objected to anything less than
for-value auction of 100% of allowances, complaining that five or six of
the staff CPUC working group options-and among these their five pre-
ferred options-would allocate without charge some or all of the
allowances to utilities.
163
Certain utilities raised the equity argument of their ratepayers.
Southern California Edison moved to have coal-fired generators given
free allowances to shield ratepayers from carbon allowance Costs.
1 64
LADWP requested an opt-out option from the cap-and-trade require-
ments.1 6 5 The utility stated that if it had to comply with California's
carbon cap-and-trade requirements, it would have to either jettison its
renewable energy program or raise rates substantially.1 66 AB 32 specifi-
cally requires the California Air Resources Board to consider the cumula-
tive impact of direct and indirect sources of emissions, including the
impact on adversely affected communities, to prevent an increase in toxic
and criteria air pollutants. 167 Most of the funds collected from the auc-
tion would be transferred back to LSEs to rebate in lower costs to their
04-009, D. 07-OIIP-01, at 5 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n & Cal. Energy Res. Conserv. &
Dev. Comm'n, Nov. 21, 2008), http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/efile/R/94323.pdf.
160. LADWP, Opening Comments, supra note 147, at 8.
161. Divisions Deepen, supra note 151.
162. Id.
163. Id
164. Lisa Weinzimer, Debate Heats up Over Allocating CO2 Allowances in Calif;
Generators Deny Windfall is Possible, PITrs ELEC. UTIL. WK., Apr. 28, 2008, at 13, 14.
Load served and historical emissions both would be factors in determining the amount of
allowances given. Id.
165. Id. (describing the endorsement of this measure by some Southern California
lawmakers).
166. Id.
167. See Assem. B. 32 § 38570 (Cal. 2006), http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/
asm/ab_0001-0050/ab_32_bill_20060927_chaptered.pdf (explaining that the state board
shall "design any market-based compliance mechanism to prevent any increase in the
emissions of toxic air contaminants or criteria air pollutants").
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consumers. 168 LADP continues to fight the California cap-and-trade
proposal as a "wealth transfer" between utility ratepayers in different
parts of the state and distrusts that auction funds, once in the hands of
state legislators, would be returned to utility ratepayers. 169  The
LADWP, at the end of 2008, threatened legal suit over the CARB Cali-
fornia proposal to auction carbon emission allowances, alleging that it
would result in a $1 billion/year transfer from legacy coal utilities in the
Southern part of the state to Northern legacy non-coal utilities and their
ratepayer in the North. 170  LADWP also charged that auction of
allowances was an illegal tax and violated the state Constitution. 171 The
petition of LADWP to CPUC and the California Energy Commission
was taken under review.
172
Terry Tamminen, an energy advisor to California Governor
Schwarzenegger, characterized the LADWP position as "morally bank-
rupt" and stated that "it is time for those utilities [that] have put them-
selves in this position to step up and internalize the costs that they have
been foisting on the rest of us for decades . . . so that people in Los
Angeles can have cheap electricity." 173 This California struggle foreshad-
ows a similar struggle with federal legislation and in other carbon-regu-
lating states. There are legal issues confronting the viability of these
choices. 174  The RGGI states have already confronted these questions
and largely decided to auction allowances and keep the money for gov-
ernment-funded projects.
C. The U.S. Regional Carbon Initiatives
There are two regional carbon initiatives in the U.S., involving mul-
tiple states and Canadian provinces. The Western Climate Initiative
(WCI) includes seven U.S. states-Oregon, Washington, California, Ari-
zona, New Mexico, Montana, and Utah-as well as the four premiers of
Canada-British Columbia, Quebec, Ontario, and Manitoba. 175  In
168. Activists Back California GHG Plan Despite Phased-In Auction, CARBON CON-
TROL NEWS, Sept. 22, 2008, available at http://carboncontrolnews.com/index.php/ccn/
show/activistsback_california-ghgplan.despitephased in auction/.
169. Id.
170. Major Utility Argues California GHG Plan Illegal, Seeks Rehearing, CARBON
CONTROL NEWS, Dec. 1, 2008, at 2.
171. Id.
172. California Utilities Debate Legality of Califbrnia Cap-and- Trade Plan, CARBON
CONTROL NEWS, Dec. 15, 2008, at 7.
173. Weinzimer, supra note 4, at 8.
174. See infra Part IV.
175. The original agreement was signed in February 2007 by the Governors of
Arizona, California, New Mexico, Oregon, and Washington. In May 2007, the state of
Utah and the Canadian provinces of British Columbia and Manitoba joined WCI. The
states of Kansas, Colorado, Wyoming, and Nevada; the Canadian provinces of Ontario,
Quebec, and Saskatchewan; and one Mexican state, Sonora, will participate in WCI as
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August 2007, WCI announced the establishment of its regional, econ-
omy-wide goal to reduce GHG emissions to 15% below 2005 levels by
2020.176 This is set forth in Table I below.
TABLE I: STATE AND PROVINCIAL GOALS FOR GHG REDUCTIONS 177
Short Term (2010-12) Medium Term (2020) Long Term (2040-50)
Arizona not established 2000 levels by 2020 50% below 2000 by 2040
British Columbia not established 33% below 2007 by 2020 not established
California 2000 levels by 2010 1990 levels by 2020 80% below 1990 by 2050
Manitoba 6% below 1990 6% below 1990178 not established
New Mexico 2000 levels by 2012 10% below 2000 by 2020 75% below 2000 by 2050
Oregon arrest emissions growth 10% below 1990 by 2020 >75% below 1990 by 2050
Utah Will set goals by June 2008
Washington not established 1990 levels by 2020 50% below 1990 by 2050
The WCI goals are based on: (1) aggregate GHG emissions and
2020 goals already established by WCI partners; 179 (2) emissions inven-
tories from states or provinces, where available; (3) gross emissions esti-
mates (across all sectors) for the six GHGs reported to the U.N.
Framework Convention on Climate Change; 180 and (4) load-based emis-
sions estimates for the electricity sector.18 1 Half of the WCI states have
not been able to approve the necessary state legislation.
182
To achieve the new regional GHG emissions reduction goal, WCI is
committed to limiting emissions that contribute to climate change from
observers. See Cathy Cash, Western Region Plan to Reduce GHG Emissions has Energy
Suppliers Waiting for Specifics, PIATTs ELEC. UTIL. WK., Aug. 27, 2007, at 1, 20; see also
WCI: Western Climate Initiative, http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org (last visited
Mar. 14, 2009).
176. Press Release, W. Climate Initiative, Western Climate Initiative Members Set
Regional Target to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Aug. 22, 2007), http://www.west-
ernclimateinitiative.org/ewebeditpro/items/O 104F 13013.pdf, see also Regional Initiatives:
The Pew Center on Global Climate Change (June 2007), http://www.pewclimate.org/
what s beingdone/in the states/regional-initiatives.cfm?preview=l (describing the
Western Climate Initiative's greenhouse gas emissions target).
177. W. CLIMATE INITIATIVE, STATEMENT OF REGIONAL GOAL 4 (Aug. 22,
2007), http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/ewebeditpro/items/O 104F 13006.pdf.
178. Manitoba "has not yet established a formal goal for 2020, but expects to
meet or do better than its short term goal." Id. at 4 n.2.
179. An important facet of the regional, economy-wide goal is its consistency with
the preexisting emission goals of WCI members; see id. at 6.
180. These six GHGs are: carbon dioxide (C0 2), methane (CH 4), nitrous oxide
(N20), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride
(SF 6). Id. at 2.
181. For a description of the metrics used to establish the WCI Regional Goal, see
id. at 3.
182. Utility Argues Renewable Credit Trading Key to California GHG Cuts, supra
note 135, at 3.
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all sources of GHGs including, but not restricted to, stationary sources,
energy supply, residential, commercial, industrial, transportation, waste
management, agriculture, and forestry. 183 Eventually, WCI's plan to
curb emissions will focus on power plants and vehicles. Implementing
the WCI plan will likely restrict the continued development of coal-fired
power generation facilities, because it will otherwise be difficult to meet
the emission reduction goals. In developing its market approach, WCI
members are engaging in discussions with leaders in the Regional Green-
house Gas Initiative on the East Coast and may consider some variety of
incentives, standards, and regulations similar to the approach California
has taken to combat climate change. 184 Like RGGI, the WCI also rec-
ommended that between 25% and 75% of total emission allowances be
auctioned.i85 The seven WCI states represent more than 20% of the
U.S. economy, and the four associated Canadian provinces represent
70% of the Canadian economy. WCI will start with a minimum 10%
allowance auction in 2012, ramping up to a minimum 25% auction by
2020. California, the lead WCI state, plans to move eventually to 100%
auction of allowances.186 Each of the participating states will make its
own decisions, which could cause distortions as compliance allowances
are given away for free in one state and auctioned in another, with free
trading allowed. However, this is less than the 100% allowance alloca-
tion that several RGGI states have elected. Environmental groups want
allowance auction. 187 Unlimited banking of allowances from year to year
would be allowed."'
Groups in WCI states are concerned that the GHG reduction plan
there might "crush the voluntary market for RECs." 189 The concern is
that the area will not be able to create more green power. The groups
argue that the purchase of RECs should be tied to the reduction of the
GHG cap that will be imposed. California has complained that the WCI
will impose an inordinate burden on the California power sector starting
in 2012 by excluding the transportation sector until 2015.i90 Because
California utilities rely on out-of-state electricity imports, California util-
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Whetzel, supra note 92, at 702.
186. CARB, Climate Change Scoping Plan (Dec. 11, 2008).
187. See Environmentalists Urge Western States to Auction GHG Allowances, CAR-
BON CONTROL NEWS, Sept. 18, 2008, available at http://carboncontrolnews.com/index.
php/ccn/show/environmentalists-urge westernstatesrto-auction-ghg-allowances/
(describing the claim of several environmentalists that a significant industry windfall
occurs in the EU-ETS where allowances are given away without charge).
188. Whetzel, supra note 92, at 703.
189. Will Harrington, Critics Say Western GHG Plan Would Crush Renewable
Trading Market, CARBON CONTROL NEWS, Aug. 25, 2008, at 1, 8.
190. California Utilities Cry Foul Over Western State Cap-and-Trade Plan, CARBON
CONTROL NEWS, Aug. 25, 2008, at 4, 5.
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ities argue that they require extra allocation of any allowances. 19' They
also urge WCI to increase the currently considered 10% limit on the use
of offsets to demonstrate compliance. Environmental groups have
claimed that 10% is too high.192 Dissent has occurred in the WCI
efforts to craft a Western state carbon reduction agreement effective
2012. Amid dissent at the end of 2008, they formed several new com-
mittees to try to work through the number and location of allowed car-
bon offsets and whether allowances will be auctioned.
193
In November 2007, nine Midwestern states-Minnesota, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Kansas, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wiscon-
sin-and two Canadian provinces-Manitoba and Ontario-executed a
regional GHG emission reduction strategy.19 4 Three of these nine U.S.
states are observing rather than participating initially.1 95 The group
worked to develop a cap-and-trade carbon program in 2008 for imple-
mentation in 2010. This accord will not set a specific target but will
attempt to cut emissions by 2020.
The Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord will establish a
system to enable tracking, management, and crediting for entities that
reduce GHGs. This region depends heavily on coal-fired electric genera-
tion. 196 Because of the predominance of coal-fired power in the Midwest
region, the plan may be somewhat different than for California and the
RGGI states that do not contain as much coal-fired power.
Under consideration is a Wisconsin plan that would allocate
allowances for a set fee, rather than auction them.' 97 Recommendations
would allow 10-50% of reductions to be achieved through the use of
allowances.198 There is an ongoing dispute as to whether allowances can
come from other states.
199
The carbon regulation schemes of RGGI, California, the Western
states, and the Midwest states collectively include about half of the U.S.
191. Id.
192. Id
193. Western Climate Officials Create New Panels to Tackle Tough Policies, CARBON
CONTROL NEWS, Nov. 18, 2008.
194. Joe Truini, 9 Midwest States Set GHG Goals, WASTE NEWS, Nov. 27, 2007, at
1, available at http://www.wasterecyclingnews.com/arcshow.html?id=07112600101.
195. Id.
196. See DARLENE RADCLIFFE, MIDWESTERN GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION ENERGY
SUMMIT, THE IMPORTANCE OF LEADING THE NATION IN ADVANCED COAL AND CAR-
BON CAPTURE TECHNOLOGIES 3 (2007), http://www.midwesterngovernors.org/MGA
%20EnergyO/o2Olnitative/2007%20Summit/MGA%20November%202007%20
Conference-radcliffe.pdf (illustrating that for several states in the region, coal supplies
more than 50% of the state's electricity).
197. Midwest GHG Plans Offer Options frr Agreement on Allowances, Offiets, CAR-
BON CONTROL NEWS, Sept. 15, 2008, available at http://carboncontrolnews.com/index.
php/ccn/show/midwestghplansoffer options for agreement on allowancesoffsets.
198. Id.
199. Id.
AUCTIONING THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF LIFE
states plus several Canadian provinces. California and those states that
are participating in just the RGGI scheme are significant in scale,
approaching the entire emissions of the nation of Japan. RGGI only
affects CO 2 from larger power plants, whereas the regional climate initia-
tives seek to also include all GHGs and various other economic sectors.
California regulates all GHGs from a variety of large industrial sources
and the transportation sector. RGGI allows steep penalties for those
with insufficient allowances, but, unlike California, does not criminalize
these failures.20 ° California's program will not go into effect until 2012
and can monitor the progress of the RGGI program, which starts in
2009.201
IV. ALLOWANCE ALLOCATION OR AUCTION: THE LEGAL
IMPLICATIONS OF THE DISPUTE
A. The Legal Choices
1. Program Design Options
There are a variety of policy choices regarding allowance distribu-
tion that are made in any market-based environmental regulatory scheme
to regulate carbon:
• whether GHG allowances are distributed free to traditional
emission sources or are auctioned to the highest bidders
• who is eligible to purchase and trade allowances
• periods of eligibility for use of allowances and banking and
carryover of allowances
* whether compliance can be achieved through creation and use
of offsets, and if so, what kinds of projects are eligible for crea-
tion of offsets, and what requirements are imposed for
"additionality."
The greatest concerns about carbon trading are the requirements of
"additionality" and verification of offsets.20 2 The alternative to a trad-
able cap-and-trade system is a carbon tax. A carbon tax would eliminate
the need to auction allowances to generators and would replace it with a
direct fee on carbon-emitting activities or materials. This would avoid
the large administrative cost and the possibility of gaming and corruption
200. CHARLES HOLT ET AL., AUCTION DESIGN FOR SELLING CO 2 EMISSIONS
ALLOWANCES (Oct. 2007), http://www.rggi.org/docs/rggi-auction-final.pdf.
201. Id.; Fight Intensifies Over Unsettled California Plan for GHG Auctions, CAR-
BON CONTROL NEWS, Oct. 28, 2008, available at http://carboncontrolnews.com/index.
php/ccn/show/fight_intensifiesover unsettled-california-planfor-ghg-auctions/ (dis-
cussing controversy over cap-and-trade program allowance beginning in 2012).
202. U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CARBON OFFSETS: THE U.S. VOL,
UNTARY MARKET IS GROWING, BuT QUALrrY ASSURANCE POSES CHALLENGES FOR
MARKET PARTICIPANTS 25 (2008), http:l/www.gao.govlnew.items/d08lo48.pdf [herein-
after GAO, CARBON OFFSETS].
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of the cap-and-trade system. The revenues raised could be directly
returned to consumers if one chooses who would ultimately pay these
fees. NASA's climatologist James Hansen testified that "the marketplace,
not politicians[, should] make investment decisions-the people must
demand 100 percent dividend-no special interests. 12 0 3 The U.S. Con-
gressional Budget Office also endorsed a carbon tax as the most efficient
alternative to implement.2 °4
Global climate change is "one of the nation's most significant long-
term policy challenges."2 5 A carbon fee or tax is viewed as the most
efficient means to cause such reductions in the U.S. °6 A tax could be as
much as five times as high as an inflexible cap, and achieve the GHG
reduction targets at a fraction of the cost. 0 7 A tax has the advantage of
allowing coverage of indirect carbon emissions as well as biological
resources like deforestation, which by itself accounts for 17% of global
GHGs.2 ° s
Notwithstanding these perspectives, the states are moving in favor
of auctioning all allowances to industry and keeping the revenues for
public-sector projects. According to critic Bjorn Lomborg, "Politicians
favor the cap-and-trade system because it is an indirect tax that disguises
the true costs of reducing carbon emissions. It also gives lawmakers an
opportunity to control the number and distribution of emissions
allowances, and the flow of billions of dollars of subsidies and
sweeteners. 
209
The use of offsets for compliance increases the compliance options
and, by increasing supply, can decrease the total cost of compliance by an
estimated 71%.210 Over 600 separate entities develop, market, or sell
offsets in the U.S. in markets that have limited transparency. 1 ' Prices
paid in global and U.S. markets for the sale of offsets have ranged from
$1.83 to $306/CO 2e, with a volume-weighted average price of $6.212 Of
the projects tracked that produced offsets, only twenty-three of the 211
in the United States occurred in the ten RGGI states, which is the only
203. Charles Davis, Carbon Tax Gains Support Among Environmentalists, Conserva-
tives, CARBON CONTROL NEWS, June 30, 2008, at 1, 10.
204. Id.
205. U.S. CONG., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, POLICY OPTIONS FOR REDUCING
CO 2 EMISSIONS vii (Feb. 2008), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/89xx/doc8934/02-12-Car-
bon.pdf.
206. Id. at vi-ix.
207. Id. at x.
208. IPCC FOURTH SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 15, at 36.
209. Bjorn Lomborg, A Better Way Than Cap and Trade, WASH. POST, June 26,
2008, at A19.
210. GAO, CARBON OFFSETS, supra note 202, at 33.
211. Id. at 7, 9. 210 of these were original providers of offsets, including eighty-
seven that were U.S. bases. Id. at 9.
212. Id. at 7.
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place at the moment that they have regulatory value.2 13 According to a
former Clinton administration official, "the vast majority of offsets are, at
some level, just rip-offsets." 2 14
According to former White House Chief of Staff John Podesta,
while a carbon fee or tax would be simpler than a cap-and-trade system, a
carbon fee has lost popularity because it is seen as an additional tax.2 15
Carbon taxes are considered simpler, and they avoid the cap-and-trade
necessity of monitoring allowance trading, banking, and borrowing.
Carbon taxes have been used in Italy, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Nor-
way, and the Netherlands. 216 The costs of obtaining necessary traded
allowances will vary with a cap-and-trade system depending on the allo-
cation and trading volatility, as opposed to the certainty and trans-
parency of a carbon tax-although a cap-and-trade system offers the
possibility of trade credits between nations, which is not a feature of a
tax.
Both a cap-and-trade system and a carbon tax can be imposed either
upstream or downstream in the societal production process. Imposing
regulation or a tax upstream has the advantage of affecting all carbon that
enters the economy at its point of origin. For fossil fuels, this dramati-
cally reduces the number of entities to be regulated. CO 2 regulation at
the state level, however, raises legal issues as states reach across state lines,
affecting the regulation of interstate commerce.21 7 Regulating CO 2 at
the state level also invokes a classic "race to the bottom" paradigm:
because there is no direct local impact from CO 2 emissions, there will be
a temptation for some states to not effectively restrict state CO 2
emissions.
If regulation instead occurs downstream at the point that fossil fuel
is burned, there are hundreds of millions of sources just in the U.S. Indi-
vidual residential consumers are responsible for at least one-third of all
carbon emissions, the largest single share.21 8 Given the sheer numbers,
coverage of sufficient sources becomes much more complex, as does the
entire system of administration, monitoring, and verification. The prior
ability to trade allowances for leaded gas, SO 2, and NO, all adopted
downstream regulation. However, there they were dealing with a finite
213. Id. at 16, 18.
214. Rethinking Offiets, CARBON CONTROL NEWS, Oct. 9, 2008, available at
http://carboncontrolnews.com/index.php/ccn/show/rethinking-offsets/.
215. Elisabeth Rosenthal, Europe Turns to Coal, Raising Alarms on Climate Change,
N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 23, 2008, at Al.
216. David G. Duff, Tax Policy and Global Warming, 51 CAN. TAX J. 2063, 2090
(2003).
217. See Steven Ferrey, Goblets of Fire: Potential Constitutional Impediments to the
Regulation of Global Warming, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 835 (2008).
218. See Michael P. Vandenbergh & Anne C. Steinemann, The Carbon-Neutral
Individual, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1673, 1691-94 (2007) (describing the authors' methodol-
ogy for calculating quantities of emissions attributable to individual behavior).
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number of refineries or power plants, not with tens of thousands of emit-
ters. Downstream, there are many more ultimate users of carbon to be
affected, including every motor vehicle.
As set forth below, auction of emission allowances to those emitters
required to have them is contrary to all U.S. precedent and contrary to
the way that parties to the U.N. Kyoto Carbon Protocol have distributed
allowances within both Kyoto and the European Union carbon
schemes.21 9 Therefore, the current so-called "windfall"2 20 from distrib-
uting emission allowances without charge to emitters is, in fact, the
established regulatory cap-and-trade practice in industrialized countries,
including in the U.S. It has not been criticized as a "windfall" during the
past three decades when allowances have been distributed for pollutants
such as NO, and SO 2 that have immediate local and regional repercus-
sions. The concern about a "windfall" from free allocation of emission
allowances has coalesced around CO 2, which all humans expel naturally
and which, until recently, was not even legally deemed a pollutant in the
U.S. 221
All ten of the states in the U.S. that have regulated carbon as of
2009 have allowed the additional use of "offsets" to meet some of the
cap-and-trade compliance requirements.2 22 It also appears that Califor-
nia will allow liberal use of "offsets" once its program is formalized and in
place. Democratic Committee Chair Senator Boxer introduced amend-
ments to preserve these state programs and their use of offsets against
preemption by federal law, should federal carbon regulation be
enacted. 223  In 2009, the Waxman-Markey climate change bill specifi-
cally preempts state carbon regulation between 2012-17, but not
thereafter.z2 4
219. See infra Part IV.A.2.a.
220. Carol M. Browner & Bob Sussman, On Energy Policy, Is Better Than Bush
Enough?, BOSTON GLOBE, June 10, 2008, at A23.
221. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007) (reasoning that carbon
dioxide and other greenhouse gases "fit well within the [Clean Air] Act's capacious defini-
tion of 'air pollutant'").
222. This is true for the ten RGGI states. Six generic baskets of offsets are
allowed.
223. S. 1785, 110th Cong. (2007) (containing proposed Boxer amendments to
expedite EPA review of waiver applications), available at http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/
query/z?c1 10:S.1785.RS:.
224. See American Clean Energy and Security ("Waxman-Markey") Act of 2009,
111 th Cong. § 335 (Discussion Draft), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/
Press_11 1/20090331/acesadiscussiondraft.pdf.
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2. The International Program Choices
a. Allowance Allocation Without Charge
The European Union and Kyoto Protocol carbon schemes are the
first regulations of carbon in the world. The E.U. carbon program has
elected to provide allowances to emit without charge. During the history
of the E.U. program, allowances have been given away for free, and for
the thirteen years of the U.S. allowance program almost all allowances
have been given away to dischargers without charge.225 The E.U. has
limited auction of allowances by a covered nation to no more than 10%
in the current Phase II prior to 2013, but actual auction of allowances is
predicted to be minimal. So far, Denmark, Ireland, Hungary, and Lithu-
ania have auctioned allowances. 226  Coal-dependent countries, such as
Poland, are pushing against immediate auction of allowances in the E.U.
system.2 2
7
The EU-ETS system utilizes National Allocation Plans for the free
distribution of allowances. 228 The E.U. includes limits on any combus-
tion source exceeding 20 MW. Households, the agricultural sector, and
transportation are excluded. This system covers only CO2 and to date
less than 50% of total E.U. CO2 emissions, 229 and the result has been
that, rather than reducing carbon output, European covered states' car-
bon dioxide emissions rose 1.1% in 2007.230 The EU-ETS covers 5,000
companies and 12,000 industrial site emissions.2 3' It is difficult to con-
clude that the E.U. system resulted in any carbon reductions that would
225. Climate Change Legislation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Energy and Natu-
ral Resources, 110th Cong. 32-33 (2008) [hereinafter Climate Change Legislation] (pre-
pared statement of Peter R. Orszag, Dir., Cong. Budget Office).
226. Judit Zegng, Lithuanian Emissions Auction Success Expected, BUDAPEST Bus.
J., Sept. 3, 2007, available at http://www.euets.com/index.php?page=news&newsid=62&
1=1.
227. EU GHG Trading Up in Air, CARBON CONTROL NEWS, Oct. 9, 2008, avail-
able at http://carboncontrolnews.com/index.php/ccn/show/eu ghg-trading-up-in-the_
air/.
228. Euro. Parliament & Council of the Euro. Union, Directive 2003/87/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council, Establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas
Emission Allowance Trading Within the Community and Amending Council Directive 96/61/
EC, OFFICIAL J. E.U., Oct. 13, 2003, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.
do?uri=OJ:L:2003:275:0032:0046:EN:pdf [hereinafter E.U. Directive].
229. Questions and Answers on the Commission ' Proposal to Revise the EU-ETS,
MEMO/08/35, Jan. 23, 2008, at q. 19, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleases
Action.do?reference=MEMO/08/35&format=HTML&aged=0&anguage=EN&guiLan-
guage=en.
230. EU Trading Experience Cited by Opponents, Backers of Lieberman-Warner,
CARBON CONTROL NEWS, May 9, 2008, available at http://carboncontrolnews.com/
index.php/ccn/show/eu trading-experiencescited-byopponents-backers of lieber-
manwarner/.
231. Seb Walhain, Carbon Trading- The View From the Floor, in Watchman, supra
note 1, at 87 (citing E.U. Directive, supra note 228).
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not have occurred in the absence of the cap-and-trade system, according
to Rachel Miller, Director of Federal Affairs for BP.232 U.S. Representa-
tive DeFazio noted that E.U. carbon markets have caused speculators to
profit on E.U. cap-and-trade.2 33
The current carbon regimes represent as much political trading as
an objective application of neutral scientific principles. The twenty-
seven participating Annex I E.U. countries made significant political dif-
ferentiation among their responsibilities to reduce carbon emissions,
ranging from a 28% carbon reduction (Luxembourg) to an allowed 27%
carbon increase (Portugal).2 34 Australia is allowed to increase emissions
up to 8%, while Russia, Ukraine, and New Zealand have no reduction
requirements.23 5 It is unclear whether the auction would be national or a
centralized European auction. The rationale is to prevent power sector
windfall profits, where U.K., Spanish, and other power generators passed
on the nominal cost of 2005-07 carbon allowances to customers.236
There is some opposition to treating the power sector differently, as well
as for exempting district heating systems from auction.2 37
The fundamental comparative policy tensions within the E.U. on
carbon cap-and-trade regulation have included: (1) whether individual
countries have been willing to cede decisionmaking to the E.U. in Brus-
sels, and (2) conflict between Western original E.U. members in more
developed nations (the so-called "EU-15") and newer Eastern and Cen-
tral E.U. members (the "accession countries") on allowance allocation
and equity issues.238  The accession countries have seen their carbon
emissions fall due to economic restructuring. However, post-2012, the
E.U. proposal is to allow Central and Eastern E.U. countries to increase,
rather than reduce, emissions up to 20% above 2005 levels.239
Auction of allowances is emerging as a key area of conflict. The
E.U. program committed to free allocation of allowances, which won
232. Davis, supra note 203.
233. Id.
234. Anthony Hobley, Creating a Global Carbon Market, in Watchman, supra note
1, at 127, 129.
235. Id. at 129.
236. Stephen Gardiner, EU Parliament, Council Making Progress on Post-2012
Emissions Trading Scheme, [2008] 39 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1418.
237. Id.
238. A. DENNY ELLERMAN & PAUL L. JOSKOW, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE, THE EUROPEAN UNION'S EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEM IN PERSPECrIVE 37
(2008), http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploadslEU-ETS-In-Perspective-Report.pdf;
JUDSON JAFFE & ROBERT STAVINS, INT'L EMISSIONS TRADING ASS'N, LINKING TRAD-
ABLE PERMIT SYSTEMS FOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS: OPPORTUNITIES, IMPLICA-
TIONS, AND CHALLENGES (2007), www.ieta.org/ieta/www/pages/getfile.php?doclD=
2733.
239. Renata Goldirova, Brussels to Unveil EU Green Strategy Amid Strong Criticism,
EU OBSERVER, Jan. 21, 2008, http://euobserver.com/9/25493.
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industry support in most E.U. countries. Even though in Phase I
(2005-07) up to 5% of carbon emissions allowances could be elected to
be auctioned by an E.U. country, only four of the twenty-seven states
employed any auction, and then in total auctioned only 0.13% of total
allowance allocation. 24' During the current 2008-12 period, it is
expected that eight Western European nations will auction 3% of E.U.
allowances.2 41
The Eastern E.U. countries are concerned about their in-country
regulated industries having to purchase at auction their allowances to
emit CO 2 in the future EU-ETS.2 42 The Eastern European E.U. bloc of
countries assert that their industries are more energy-intensive than West-
ern E.U. nations, and thus would be competitively disadvantaged by hav-
ing to purchase allowances in the future, as opposed to current free give-
away of allowances. 24 3 They are pushing for a provision that would
allow their industry to invest in more energy efficiency for housing, and
not have to reduce their industrial CO 2 emissions, like an in-country
CDM mechanism.24 4
These Eastern E.U. countries were supported by France and Luxem-
bourg, who also asserted their own industries had more energy inten-
sity.24 5 Italy is resisting E.U. reforms to require the power industry to
purchase auctioned allowances to emit CO 2 as "unsuitable," "untenable,"
and "an act of madness." 246 Auction of CO2 allowances to all power
generators has been proposed by the European Commission to com-
mence in 2013.247 European environmental NGOs are resisting any
248
retreat from future auction.
Because of inconsistencies and controversies in individual countries,
there is broad agreement on post-2012 centralized E.U. allocation of
emissions rights, eliminating national allocation.2 49 Some of the Eastern
European countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, etc.) are
expected to challenge their future allocations. Central and Eastern Euro-
pean states have launched legal proceedings against the European Com-
240. FRANK CONVERY ET AL., THE EUROPEAN CARBON MARKET IN ACTION:
LESSONS FROM THE FIRST TRADING PERIOD 11 (MIT Global Change Science Policy
Report No. 162, June 2008), http://web.mit.edu/globalchange/www/MITJPSPGC..Rpt
162.pdf.
241. ELLERMAN & JOSKOW, supra note 238, at 38.
242. Leigh Phillips & Renata Goldirova, Emissions Permit Auctioning Key Concern




246. Renata Goldirova, Rocky Path Ahead for EU Green Legislation, EU OBSERVER,
Oct. 21, 2008, http://euobserver.com/9/26965.
247. ELLERMAN & JOSKOW, supra note 238, at 30.
248. Id.
249. Gardiner, supra note 236, at 1418.
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mission, alleging their AAU allocations are now too low.2 5 0 The future
could see a proposed shift to an auction of all power sector allowances in
the E.U., eliminating all free traditional allocation by 2020.251 Post-
2012, the European Commission's proposal is for auctions to be phased
in, rising to 100% auction by 2020, with the exception of 100% auction
for power generators in 2013.252 This builds on the earlier decisions to
auction in RGGI in the U.S., which auctions precede the possible E.U.
auctions by four years.
The estimate is that such auction will generate C30-50 billion
($46-$78 billion) annually.253 There are issues about how large these
sums will be, and whether they will be under the control of each country
or allocated Europe-wide or internationally.2 54 The E.U. debate mirrors
somewhat the debate in the U.S. between state and federal carbon regula-
tion and preemption. The E.U. provides compliance penalties of C100
per ton between January 2008 and December 2012 for failure to have
enough AAUs.2 55 Prices of trades can fluctuate dramatically, as they did
with a twenty-fold increase in the cost of Southern California
"RECLAIM NO." allowances in 2000, or in the price collapse in the
EU-ETS system.256 The price of EUAs in the EU-ETS fell from C30 to
virtually nothing very quickly, before rebounding. This was because of
allocation imperfections with the European target for the utility sector,
allocating a deficient number of credits and creating a shortage, while
other industries, such as cement and refineries, were over-allocated cred-
its. These latter industries were slow to sell their over-allocated EUAs,
but when they did, it created a surplus that flooded the market and drove
down prices.2 57 Because the actual CO2 reductions accomplished were
relatively modest, no significant bank of excess CO2 credits buffered the
market. Moreover, it is not possible to bank EUAs between Phase I and
Phase II of the E.U. program. This is in contrast to the U.S. S02 allow-
250. Hobley, supra note 234, at 135.
251. COMM'N OF THE EURO. COMMUNITIES, DIRECTVE OF THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL, AMENDING DIRECTIVE 2003/87/EC so AS TO
IMPROVE AND EXTEND THE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION ALLOWANCE TRADING SYS-
TEM OF THE COMMUNITY (2008), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?
uri=COM:2008:0016:FIN:EN:PDF.
252. Gardiner, supra note 236, at 1418.
253. Id
254. Id.
255. E.U. Directive, supra note 228.
256. ROBERT N. STAVINS, A U.S. CAP-AND-TRADE SYSTEM TO ADDRESS GLOBAL
CLIMATE CHANGE 21 (2007), http://www.brookings.edu/-/medialFiles/rc/papers/2007/
10climatestavins/10_climate_stavins.pdf.
257. This plunge from approximately thirty euros to virtually nothing before
rebounding into the mid-point of this range occurred in April 2006. Heather Timmons,
Data Leaks Shake Up Carbon Trade, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2006, at CI.
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ance program, which created a large bank of annual emission credits,
leading to allowance trades enjoying a relatively constant price. u58
However, there is E.U. concern that allocating allowances to its
industries may make them competitive, causing the "leakage" of manu-
facturing share to other non-participating countries. The E.U. is tending
to treat industry shut-down as the forfeiture of freely allocated
allowances, and proposing to further limit emission allowances granted
to renewable energy projects.2 59
b. Offiet Trading
The Kyoto Protocol also creates compliance by importing "offsets"
from developing countries through its Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM).26 ' The CDM apparatus emerged as a last-minute compromise
creation of the 1997 Kyoto Conference.26 1 CDM was created as a means
to engage resistant developing countries and to facilitate more cost-effec-
tive credits for Annex I developed countries subject to caps. It is pat-
terned on the U.S. S02 trading experience.2 62 The Clean Development
Mechanism allows projects that reduce greenhouses gases in developing
nations to earn Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) for each ton of
C0 2-equivalent of GHG reduced.2 63 Those CERs are then traded or
sold to regulated entities in Annex I developed countries, thus increasing
that country's emission cap allocated under the Protocol.26 4
Under the Kyoto Protocol CDM, CERs and JI ERUs can be used in
future compliance to satisfy up to 2.5% of a party's annual allowed emis-
sions. However, CERs and ERUs obtained prior to 2008 can be fully
banked for use in the 2008-12 compliance period.16 5 Selling carbon
emission credits typically is done through forward contracts. CERs
(other than for afforestation) have a seven-year lifetime, with the possibil-
258. See STEVEN FERREY, 1 LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER §§ 6.81-82 (27th ed.
2009) (discussing SO2 allowances).
259. Revised EU GHG-Trading Program May Shape U.S. Proposals, CARSON CON-
TROL NEws, July 14, 2008, available at http://carboncontrolnews.com/index.php/ccn/
show/eu-trading-experience.cited.byopponents.backerso f_liebermanwarner/.
260. See infa Part IV.B.2.
261. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, arts. 12.5 & 6, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998); Cameron, supra note 55, at 31.
262. Hobley, supra note 234, at 132-33.
263. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 261, art. 12.
264. CERs Lose Out to EUAs in Recovery, CARBONPOsITIVE, Apr. 29, 2009, http://
www.carbonpositive.net/viewartide.aspx?articleID=1526. Credits earned after 2000 can
be used to achieve compliance during the first commitment period, which began in 2008.
2.5% of ERUs and CERs may be carried over to the second phase of implementation
after 2012.
265. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 261, art. 12.10.
266. Christopher Norton, Selling Carbon Credits, in Watchman, supra note 1, at
20091
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ity of two renewals, for a total of twenty-one years, or in the alternative
one ten-year lifetime.
Kyoto has allowed increases in Annex I CO2 emissions through the
CDM mechanism. But the media is questioning the credibility and effi-
cacy of CDM carbon offset projects. CDM projects to date have been
located in a limited number of countries and address only a few gases,
with "little contribution to sustainable development."2 68 As of the end
of 2006, the World Bank reported that CDM projects were located 61%
in China, 12% in India, 7% in other Asian countries, 10% in Latin
America (most significantly Brazil), and 3% in Africa.269
There are almost a thousand CDM projects, with twice that many
being developed. The existing projects have generated 117 million issued
CERs, with an estimated 2.6 billion CERs to be generated by 2012.270
This would equate to almost 10% of monitored emissions. The CDM
offset-creation element of the Kyoto Protocol, by creating significant
additional offset credits, is an indirect cap on the cost of traded carbon
allowances. By 2012, the CDM mechanism will have produced enough
carbon offsets to equal the carbon emissions of the U.K. over three
years. 2 71 The value of carbon credits and offsets is forecast to increase in
value from C8.5 billion currently to C200 billion.27 2
The early experience from the E.U. trading scheme illustrates, simi-
larly, that many industries are buying offset credits created under CDM
in developing countries, rather than making significant energy or carbon
reductions at their European host facilities.2 73 Rather than cut fossil fuel
use in developed Kyoto Annex I countries, the response has been to cre-
ate offsets in non-covered developing countries, which then increase the
entire quantity of available emissions to developed Annex I countries.27 4
In some ways, this parallels what is happening with GHG reduction
activities in developing nations. These CDM investments are cutting the
maximum GHGs per dollar invested, but not minimizing even local
GHG emissions nor necessarily implanting the proper technology at the
267. Ben Elgin, Little Green Lies, Bus. WK., Oct. 29, 2007, at 45; Andrew C.
Revkin, Carbon-Neutral is Hip, But is it Green?, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 29, 2007, at 1, 14.
268. Mohamed T. EI-Ashry, Framework for a Post-Kyoto Climate Change Agree-
ment, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y 2, 5 (2008).
269. Lauren Etter, In China, A Plan to Turn Rice Into Carbon Credits, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 9, 2007, at Al, A15.
270. Christina Voigt, Is the Clean Development Mechanism Sustainable? Some Criti-
calAspects, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEv. L. & POL'Y 15 (2008).
271. CARBON RATING AGENCY, CARBON RATINGS 6 (2008), http://carboninter-
national.com/newsletters/Carbon%/020Ratings%/o20June%/o202008.pdf.
272. Id. at 5.
273. Jeffrey Ball, Kyoto's Caps on Emissions Hit Snag in Marketplace, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 3, 2007, at Al, A19.
274. Id.
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proper place. The E.U. has announced that it may reduce CDM imports
after 2012.275
If carbon credits become the biggest market in the world, as
expected,27 6 the quality of the credits traded becomes a crucial factor.
The carbon market has misjudged regulatory risk, as well as market and
host country risks inherent in carbon offset markets. There are weak
counterparts, often lower than anticipated administrative capacity, and
financing risks. The value of carbon aggregators has plunged, with the
share prices of five public carbon market makers and CDM development
companies plunging 13-98% from mid 2007 to mid 2008.277 The risk
of CDM projects27 1 is a function of:
• the level of CDM project experience in the host country where
host country track record contributes to reducing delivery risk
• the success of the host country base project, since subsequent
projects rely on the achievements of that base project
* the degree of the design and construction risk of certain
projects.
There has been an arbitrage opportunity created in the difference in
prices between EU-ETS allowances and CDM CERs, which are offsets.
Due to the ETS market being more established, restrictions in some
nations regarding the number of CERs that may be utilized by regulated
entities annually, and the uncertainty as to whether CERs will continue
after the 2012 termination of the Kyoto Protocol, CERs have tended to
trade in Europe at about a 20-25% discount to the price of ETS
allowances. However, entities complying now during the second phase
of Kyoto with a combination of ETS and CERs can purchase CERs and
sell ETS, realizing a 20-25% gain on the swap of such substitutes.279
3. U.S. Constitutional and Legal Issues
Against this state regulatory landscape, legal challenge is imminent
to both the RGGI and California carbon regulatory schemes. The coal
industry has threatened suit against RGGI as an unauthorized tax or as
otherwise illegal. 28 ' New York officials have defended the state's author-
275. UK to Call for 50% CDM Limit From 2013, POINT CARBON, Sept. 18,
2008, http://www.pointcarbon.com/news/1.973467.
276. Nick Hodge, Carbon: The World's Next Biggest Market, ENERGY & CAPITAL,
July 23, 2007, http://energyandcapital.com/artices/carbon+trading+carbon+credits-emis-
sions+reduction/476.
277. CAusON RATING AGENCY, supra note 271, at 7.
278. Id. at 11.
279. CERs Lose Out to EUAs in Recovery, supra note 264; see also CarbonPositive,
FAQs: Climate Change, Kyoto & EU ETS (Jan. 2, 2009), http://www.carbonpositive.
net/viewarticle.aspx?articlelD=90.
280. Curt Barry, First RGGIAllowance Auction May Trigger Coal Industry Lawsuits,
CARBON CONTROL NEws, July 21, 2008, at 1, 4.
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ity to implement RGGI based on its adoption of California's GHG regu-
lations for automobiles. 28 1 However, there are legal distinctions between
programs regulating mobile sources (that were the subject of Supreme
Court determination in 2007282) and stationary sources, such as RGGI
regulations in New York. A New York RGGI official admitted that there
is a substantial chance of litigation challenge in New York, Maryland,
and Massachusetts. 283 Already, the coal, power, and railroad industries
have, prior to state program commencement, threatened some states with
suits over their RGGI auction programs.2 84
Particularly because of this interconnection, there will be an uneven
impact on generation sources inside and outside of an area of state car-
bon regulation. For example, there are three RGGI states within the
PJM RTO power control area. Generators within PJM, as within many
RTOs, are dispatched to run based on their lowest hourly bid cost. This
will disadvantage those generating resources within the three PJM RGGI
states that must add the cost of RGGI auctioned allowances to their
hourly costs of operation, which are bid to the PJM control area. 285 It
will give them an added cost compared to non-RGGI out-of-state power
generators. In its initial modeling, the group of Northeast state air regu-
lators, NESCAUM, suggested that there could be up to 90% "leakage"
into the RGGI area from outside less-expensive, non-carbon-regulated
power resources. 286 This substitution of higher-carbon external power
would defeat the very purpose of carbon regulation.
A legal challenge is forecast over California's authority to impose
carbon fees that exceed state administrative costs on "upstream" energy
sources.28" The California Assemblyman who authored California's
GHG legislation, AB 32, admitted that state regulators must identify
"direct program costs" that are "fair, appropriate and balanced" before
regulating.28 8 Since most of any auction proceeds would be well in
excess of, and not scaled to, program administrative costs, the carbon fee
may be challenged as unrelated and excessive under state law.
And these initially threatened suits may miss the true legal vulnera-
bility of some state carbon programs. Both Constitutional Supremacy
281. Id.
282. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
283. Barry, supra note 280, at 5.
284. Id.
285. Mary Powers, New Jersey Regulators, Stakeholders Mull Ways to Avoid "Leak-
age" From RGGI, PLATTs ELEC. UTIL. WK., May 5, 2008, at 4, 6.
286. See RGGI EMISSIONs LEAKAGE MULTISTATE WORKING GROUP, POTENTIAL
EMISSIONs LEAKAGE AND THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE (Mar. 2007),
http://www.rggi.org/docs/ilreport-final-3_ 4_107.pdf.
287. Curt Barry, Dispute Over California Carbon-Fee Authority May Spur Legal
Fight, CARBON CONTROL NEWS, July 21, 2008, at 1, 13.
288. Id.
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and Commerce Clause challenges potentially lurk for these programs. A
very brief review of these issues is provided below.
First is the Supremacy Clause perspective on bifurcation of state and
federal regulatory authority. In New York, for example, the New York
Department of Environmental Conservation (NYDEC) has issued offi-
cial public statements claiming that the decision and purpose of the auc-
tion of 100% of carbon allocations is to prevent affected electric
generators from earning "excess" profits resulting from the operation of
the wholesale market.289 Environmental officials have gone on record as
implementing the auction of all allowances to reduce the rate of return
that power generators receive pursuant to their FERC-approved market
rates, which NYDEC considers to include "excess" profits. 290 Thus, the
auction policy is designed to alter, at the hand of state regulators, the
"just" and "reasonable" rates wholesale power sale prices previously estab-
lished pursuant to FERC-approved tariff or market design. The com-
ments of record as California dockets work through their auction or
allocation design also evidence such concerns.
29 1
Thus, state RGGI auction is designed to impose carbon costs by
altering the market prices at which power from different generation
sources trades at the wholesale level from wholesaler power supplier to
retailer. The Federal Power Act sections 205 and 206 empower FERC to
regulate rates for the interstate or wholesale sale and transmission of elec-
tricity.2 9 2 This state regulation could run afoul of the Federal Power
Act's investment of exclusive federal jurisdiction over such wholesale
289. In its Notice of Pre-Proposal of New York RGGI Rule, NYSDEC stated:
Because the value of the allowances will be included as a cost in the generators'
bids to supply electricity, the price of electricity will be the same whether the
allowances are given away at no cost to generators or generators must purchase
allowances. An allowance giveaway, therefore, means that generators are able
to substantially increase their revenues (and hence, profits) under a program
like RGGI because they pass on the cost of a commodity they obtained at no
charge. This has been referred to as "excess revenues," and these excess reve-
nues occur at the expense of electricity consumers.
Under the proposed RGGI rule, the modestly increased costs to electricity
consumers will be cycled back through energy efficiency investments that will
reduce the demand for electricity, thereby taking pressure off the electricity
process and the need for new generation in the State. These investments will
also greatly complement the carbon cap and trade rule by maximizing emis-
sions reductions. In short, the maximum benefits of the program will inure to
the benefit of those paying for it, rather than end up increasing the profits of
generators through a non-auction allocation method.
N.Y. State Dep't Envtl. Conserv., Notice of Pre-Proposal of New York RGGI Rule (Dec.
5, 2006), http://www.dec.ny.gov/regulations/26450.html.
290. Id.
291. See, e.g., Request for Rehearing/Reconsideration, supra note 159, at 5.
292. 16 U.S.C. § 824(d)-(e) (2006).
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terms and price matters, and separation of such authority preempted by
the Supremacy Clause and the Filed Rate Doctrine.2 93
The Federal Power Act creates a "bright line" between state and
federal jurisdiction, with wholesale power prices and sales falling clearly
and unequivocally on the federal side of the line. 294 The so-called "Filed
Rate Doctrine" holds that state regulatory agencies may not second-guess
or overrule on any grounds a wholesale rate determination made pursu-
ant to federal jurisdiction.29 5 The Supreme Court in 1986, and again in
1988 and 2003, upheld the Filed Rate Doctrine.2 96 Attempts by states
indirectly or directly to promote higher wholesale energy prices for cer-
tain higher-cost low-carbon renewable energy projects have been stricken
by the courts. For example, in 1994, the Ninth Circuit rejected the Cali-
fornia Public Utility Commission's claim that it had independent author-
ity to regulate the prices and terms for such low-carbon renewable power
sales.2 97 The environmental purpose of carbon regulation, when accom-
panied by discriminatory purpose or effect, creates significant constitu-
tional issues under controlling Supreme Court precedent.
Second, the Commerce Clause could limit state efforts to stop
power "leakage." Administering state or regional carbon regulatory
schemes also is fraught with the problem of "leakage" of less expensive
power that is not similarly brought into the region from outside, as fore-
cast by NESCAUM in response to RGGI. Where unlimited use of off-
sets is allowed, as in California, compliance can occur external to the
regulated power plant sources. 298  To stem the inflow of power from
outside the RGGI control region, the RGGI states are discussing imple-
293. See supra Part III.C. (detailing the different state regulatory schemes insti-
tuted and planned).
294. Pub. Util. Distrib. No. 1. v. FERC, 471 F.3d 1053, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006),
ajfd in part and rev'd in part, 128 S. Ct. 2733 (2008).
295. However, the Supreme Court has determined that Congress, in enacting the
Federal Power Act, intended to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the FERC to regulate inter-
state wholesale utility rates. Fed. Power Comm'n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205,
216 (1964); see also Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Burke, 381 A.2d 1358, 1361 (R.I. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 972 (1978) (federal preemption of state discretion on retail rate
pass-through of wholesale rate established pursuant to federal jurisdiction); Spence v.
Smyth, 686 P.2d 597, 600 (Wyo. 1984) (following Northern States Power Co. v. Hagen,
314 N.W.2d 32, 38 (1981)).
296. See Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 963 (1986)
("This Court has held that the filed rate doctrine applies not only to the federal-court
review at issue in Montana-Dakota, but also to decisions of state courts."); Miss. Power &
Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354 (1988) (holding that the filed rate
doctrine applies without exception to state regulation of interstate holding companies);
Entergy La., Inc. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 539 U.S. 39 (2003) (finding no residual
prudency power of the states to alter federal rate or term).
297. See Indep. Energy Prods. Ass'n v. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 36 F.3d 848 (9th
Cir. 1994) (finding no separate basis for the state PUC to act to establish a premium
price for renewable low-carbon power projects).
298. GAO, CARBON OFFSETS, supra note 202, at 36.
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menting some type of control, regulation, or tax to discourage cheaper
power imports to LSEs from unregulated states external to the RGGI (or,
similarly on the West Coast, California) regions.299 Such controls on the
free flow of electricity from other states, where electricity is a commodity
or service that is a quintessential article in interstate commerce, 3 0 poten-
tially run up against the Dormant Commerce Clause. Such regulation
by the RGGI states will have to target power flows based on their state of
power generation origin, distinguishing between those from RGGI states
and non-RGGI states. Not only is this legally problematic with power
moving in interstate commerce at the speed of light across state borders
in the wholesale power markets, 30  but it also raises serious Dormant
Commerce Clause Constitutional issues.
The effort against "leakage" by the early states is ultimately a fight
of "us" (a state regulating carbon from its power generators) versus
"them" (neighboring states or foreign countries that do not similarly reg-
ulate carbon emissions from their power sectors). The legal mechanisms
used to control such leakage can be geographically-based discriminatory
regulation. This immediately raises Dormant Commerce Clause con-
cerns, and invokes the most exacting strict scrutiny legal standard, under
which few similar state regulations have survived. A March 2007 RGGI
working group report urged states to be cautious in trying to tax or adopt
measures to frustrate leakage from outside the RGGI region.
30 2
The combination of (1) a tax or charge on exterior suppliers with
(2) a subsidy from the proceeds to certain in-state activities, as is now
contemplated by many of the RGGI states based on point of origin of
the articles in commerce, factually and legally parallels the U.S. Supreme
Court decision in West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy.3 ° 3 There, the Court
found a violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause in the state regula-
tory scheme. 3 4 The scheme imposed the net burden of the tax on out-
299. Bolster, supra note 71, at 745 ("The resulting increase in cheaper, imported
electricity will undermine the goal of the program because imported emissions will not
count towards the region's emission limits even though they are directly associated with
the region's electricity consumption.").
300. See supra Part III.B (detailing the use of electricity as traded and imported
commodity).
301. See Steven Ferrey, Inverting Choice of Law in the Wired Universe: Thermody-
namic, Mass, and Energy, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1839 (2004).
302. RGGI EMISSIONs LEAKAGE MULTI-STATE STAFF WORKING GROUP, POTEN-
TIAL EMIssIONs LEAKAGE AND THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE (2007),
http://www.rggi.org/docs/il_report_final_3-14-07.pdf.
303. 512 U.S. 186, 199 (1994).
304. The pricing order's "avowed purpose" was to enable Massachusetts dairy
farmers to compete with lower cost out-of-state farmers. The Massachusetts scheme
comprised two parts. First, the state issued a regulatory pricing order requiring every
milk dealer selling in Massachusetts, regardless of locus, to make a monthly "premium
payment" into the "Massachusetts Dairy Equalization Fund." The amount of such pay-
ments was determined by the amount of the individual dealer's "Class I" milk sales in
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of-state producers.3 ° 5 A RGGI region (or other state) surcharge or tax on
out-of-region carbon-emitting wholesale power imports bears many close
similarities to this scheme. Many of the arguments the state of Massa-
chusetts advanced unsuccessfully to the Supreme Court to defend this
regulation also apply to carbon regulation.
These constitutional issues are even more significant than a chal-
lenge under a state statute, as first-threatened litigation potentially would
involve. While a state statute can be amended or cured, there is no possi-
bility that the two fundamental pillars of federalism in the United States,
as embedded in the Constitution for two centuries, will be eliminated.
Time is running out to implement effective carbon restrictions. In
2004, GHG emissions were about one-quarter above 1990 levels, not
below these 1990 goals. 306 To achieve goals will require a relatively quick
and dramatic cut before 2050 of world GHG emissions to about one-
third of current levels, or perhaps as little as 10% of current levels. The
first emission auction in the world, with the largest and most controver-
sial and important pollution regulatory program in history, has just
begun: Eastern state auction of CO 2 allowances.
B. Precedent for Allocation and Trading of Allowances
1. U.S. Environmental Regulation
The concept of an auction for carbon allowances is where the car-
bon regulatory scheme could diverge from all historic legal precedent: all
prior emission credits have been allocated without charge to those entities
which emit. All major international and U.S. GHG programs or propos-
als have utilized cap-and-trade, rather than an alternative. This follows
the design of the current Kyoto Protocol and the current EU-ETS
systems.
It is unprecedented in U.S. environmental regulation that the allo-
cations for emissions are auctioned to pre-existing, already-built and
Massachusetts. In other words, the extraction was a direct function of the quantity sold.
Second, the fund's proceeds were distributed monthly to Massachusetts milk producers.
Each Massachusetts producer received a share from the total fund equal to his or her
proportionate share of the state's total production of raw milk. Out-of-state milk dealers
were regulatorily ineligible to receive funds. This disbursement operated as a state sub-
sidy of in-state dairy farmers, the initial link in the milk production process, by a tax
imposed on all wholesalers participating in the state market-a subsequent link in the
chain of commerce affecting this good. By the time Massachusetts declared a "state of
emergency" in early 1992, the number of dairy farms in the state had declined from
approximately 850 in 1978 to approximately 380 in late 1991. Id. at 194-96.
305. Id at 200.
306. INTERGOVTL. PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING
GROUP III TO THE FOURTH ASsESSMENT REPORT: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 3-4
(2007), http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg3/ar4-wg3-spm.pdf.
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operating emission sources. 3 7 There have been five prior cap-and-trade
markets previously established in the United States: acid rain (S02);308
the NO,, summer ozone budget program (12 state NOs); 319 CAIR,
scheduled to start in 2009 (NO, and SO 2); the Mercury Rule, scheduled
to commence in 2010 (mercury from power plants); and RECLAIM 31 °
in Southern California (NO. and SO 2). All but RECLAIM (SCAQMD)
have been administered by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA). During the 2000-01 California electricity crisis, the price of
RECLAIM allowances skyrocketed and state pressure to produce more
electricity led to surpassing of the NO, cap and an eventual removal of
electric generation from RECLAIM coverage during the crisis.3 11 All
allowances were allocated freely based on average unit heat input (acid
rain program) or depending on state-specific programs (summer ozone).
Trading of EPA allowances within these and other programs has
been allowed. Allowances for new and modified stationary sources, 312
chlorofluorocarbon reduction under the Montreal Protocol, and refinery
phase-down of lead in gasoline3 13 have all permitted trading. However,
none of these programs auctioned the emission allowances to the recipi-
ents, but rather provided them without charge, prior to any trading. In
307. Kramarchuk, supra note 82, at 45 (noting that the EPA auctions only 1% of
total S02 allowances and this does not include any auction to preexisting sources, which
are freely allocated to electric power generators).
308. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651 (2000). This cut approximately in half electric power
S02 emissions from coal-fired plants.
309. This covers the electric utility industry from the ozone season of May
through September of each year. Targeted reductions of NO, from electric power facili-
ties have escalated from about 60% reduction to about 75% reduction during Phase II.
U.S. EPA, NO, Budget Trading Program/NO. SIP Call, http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/
progsregs/nox/sip.html (last visited May 5, 2009).
310. This was targeted to limit emissions in Southern California from a heteroge-
neous group of industries. Although there is no formal banking, because of two overlap-
ping reporting periods each year, allowances can be carried beyond their nominal
expiration for six months. See South Coast Air Quality Management District,
RECLAIM Main Page, www.aqmd.gov/RECLAIM/index.htm (last visited May 5, 2009).
311. For a discussion of the California electricity crisis, see Steven Ferrey, The
Eagles of Deregulation: The Role of the Courts in a Restructured Environment, 32 ENVTI. L.
297 (2002); Steven Ferrey, Soft Paths, Hard Choices: Environmental Lessons in the After-
math of California's Electric Deregulation Debacle, 23 VA. ENV'jv. L.J. 251 (2004); Steven
Ferrey, Electricity, Contract Rules, and the Environment: Welcome to the Hotel California,
[2001] 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 11,475.
312. EPA, Emission Trading Policy Statement: General Principles for Creation,
Banking and Use of Emission Reduction Credits, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814, 43,830 (Dec. 4,
1986).
313. See Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives, 47 Fed. Reg. 49,322 (Oct. 29,
1982); Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives, 50 Fed. Reg. 9,386 (Mar. 7, 1985); Regu-
lation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Banking of Lead Rights, 50 Fed. Reg. 13,116 (Apr. 2,
1985).
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fact, even though trading was permissible, there was little trading done
under these programs.
3 14
The two most recent of these cap-and-trade programs, both the
Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAR) NO, and S02 trading rules,3 15 and the
mercury trading rules, 3 16 were held legally impermissible in 2008 by the
D.C. Court of Appeals.3 17 Most recently, in mid 2008, the D.C. Circuit
vacated the EPA's CAIR, which would have required twenty-eight states
and the District of Columbia to reduce 61% of regional NO, emissions
and 73% of regional SO 2 emissions below 2003 levels by 2015 starting in
2009, and eliminate "significant" contributions to downwind states' air
pollution.3 18 The court vacated the entire CAIR rule as impermissible,
stating, "CAIR's flaws are deep," and requiring the EPA to "redo its anal-
ysis from the ground up."31 9 The court found "more than several fatal
flaws in the rule" and remanded to the EPA to promulgate a new rule
consistent with the opinion.
320
This has raised questions as to whether the EPA can use a cap-and-
trade system to address NAAQS attainment in downwind states under
the Clean Air Act for fine particulate matter, SO 2, NO., and ozone.
32 1
314. A. DENNY ELLERMAN & PAUL L. JosKow, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE, EMISSIONS TRADING IN THE U.S.: EXPERIENCE, LESSONS, AND CONSIDERA-
TIONS FOR GREEN HOUSE GASES 8-9 (2008), http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/
emissionsstrading.pdf; Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Where DidAll the Markets
Go? An Analysis of EPA's Emissions Trading Program, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 109 (1989).
315. Rule to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone,
70 Fed. Reg. 25,162 (May 12, 2005).
316. Standards of Performance for New and Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Steam Generating Units, 70 Fed. Reg. 28,606 (May 18, 2005).
317. See New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (striking mercury
rule).
318. North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (questioning the
EPA's ability to define "significant" contribution of air pollution from one state crossing
into another state). The EPA had defended this ability in prior challenges to the NO.
SIP Call.
319. Id. at 929, 930.
320. Id. at 901.
321. Rule to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone,
supra note 315, at 25,165. The CAIR rule would have supplemented the EPA-proposed
NO. SIP Call, which imposed a duty on certain upwind sources to reduce NO, emissions
by a specified amount so they would no longer "contribute significantly to non-attain-
ment in, or interfere with maintenance by, a downwind State." Deadlines were 2010 and
2015 for SO, and 2009 and 2015 for NO,. The court applied the arbitrary, capricious,
or manifestly contrary to the statute analysis articulated in Chevron, 467 U.S. 837 (1984),
because state budgets were not based on factors relevant to the state's "significant contri-
bution." The court did not find compelling the 2015 deadline for upwind states to
eliminate their "significant contribution" to downwind non-attainment of air standards.
It noted that the standard of review applied to the Clean Air Act was the same as applied
under the APA. The court held that they could not "justify reading a substantive provi-
sion out of a statute." See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457, 485 (2001).
The court was concerned that the EPA CAIR rule made one state's significant contribu-
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The price of S02 allowances plunged by half after the CAIR decision.
The price of allowances is now claimed to be less than the cost of lime to
operate the scrubbers that reduce SO 2.3 22
The SO 2 program has traditionally been viewed as the classic success
in reducing a third of power plant emissions through a cap-and-trade
system.3 23 But even this reduction, achieved over approximately the
prior decade, does not serve well as a template for GHG reductions. The
benefits and achievements of this program were not largely from the trad-
ing of allowances.3 2 1 Instead, the availability of more low-sulfur coal at
lower prices caused the shift to lower sulfur fuel and lesser S02 emis-
sions. 325  Over half of those limited S02 trades that did occur were
between power plants owned by the same company, rather than between
companies. 326 There was little technological innovation and no switch to
renewable power sources, but primarily fuel switching to lower SO 2 emis-
sions under the S02 program.
The acid rain system is much less complex than the regulation of
GHGs, which includes various chemicals and involves impacts across all
countries of the world, not just a single country. Generally regarded as
viable and successful, the acid rain trading system, the first program of its
kind in the U.S., dramatically lowered sulfur emissions-one pollu-
tant-by about 40% from 1990 levels for one sector of the economy,
tion dependent on another state's cost of eliminating emissions. EPA in fact had never
measured individual states' "significant contributions." The court may not consider tech-
nological nor economic infeasibility when approving a SIP. Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427
U.S. 246 (1976). The court found that EPA had no authority under the Clean Air Act to
force an upwind state to share the burden of reducing other upwind states' emissions.
The Court found that the unlimited ability to buy and sell credits between states did not
ensure that contributions from one state would not contribute to another state. SIPs and
the petition process under Section 126 of the Clean Air Act remain in place. The NO,
SIP Call and summer ozone allowances continue despite the vacation of CAIR with
regard to NO,. However, some states will need to pursue additional reductions where the
NO, SIP Call was replaced by CAIR.
322. E. Howland et al., Utilities Eye Adverse Consequences of CAIR Ruling as They
Assess Outlook for Earning, PLATrs ELEC. UTIL. WK., Aug. 11, 2008, at 10.
323. See U.S. EPA, AciD RAIN AND RELATED PROGRAMS: 2006 PROGRESS
REPORT 3-4 (2005), http://www.epa.gov/AIRMARKETS/progress/docs/2006-ARP-
Report.pdf [hereinafter ACID RAIN AND RELATED PROGRAMS] ("With nearly 6.1 million
unused (banked) allowances from prior years, SO 2 emissions were 40 percent below the
total 2006 allowable SO2 emissions of 15.7 million tons.").
324. U.S. CONG. JoINT ECON. COMM., TRADABLE EMISSIONS 2, 5-6 (1997),
http://www.house.gov/jec/cost-gov/regs/cost/emission.pdf (finding a fuel substitution in
SO 2 program other than real reductions in fuels).
325. Curtis A. Moore, The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments: Failing the Acid Test,
[2004] 34 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,366, 10,379.
326. ELLERMaN & JOSKOW, supra note 314, at 21-22 (showing how there was a
greater volume of RECLAIM trading credits traded without price-traded internally
among different sources owned by the same firm-than those traded with price).
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U.S. power plants.32 7 This was achieved not so much from efficiency
investments or conventional emissions controls, but significantly from
converting the sulfur content of coal fuel sources so that plants could
operate on lower-sulfur coal. 328 These choices resulted in estimated cost
savings of about $1 billion annually compared to a command-and-con-
trol scheme. 32
9
While economists generally estimate that the various U.S. cap-and-
trade systems have resulted in the most cost-effective mitigation mea-
sures, and save money compared to the alternative of a command-and-
control scheme for pollutant reduction,33 ° SO 2 reductions affected only
111 discrete power facilities, principally in the Midwest. 33' It was lim-
ited in terms of both geography and emissions sources. It was not really
economy-wide, and there is no national experience with a cap-and-trade
system affecting all industrial activities.
These prior EPA emission trading programs also focused on refin-
eries and the utility industry as primary sources. However, with GHGs,
there are numerous pollutants and numerous sources. 2 While about
one-third of this originates from power generation facilities, and another
one-quarter from transportation through hundreds of millions of indi-
vidual vehicles operating, there are hundreds of millions of additional
smaller industrial, commercial, and residential sources that contribute
CO 2. In Western and more rural states, transportation can dominate
power generation for the primary CO 2 emission share. RGGI, for exam-
ple, only addresses larger power plants, and no other sectors of the
economy.
By contrast, CO 2 emissions are a function of combustion of fossil
fuels, and fuel-switching alone will not solve the fact of combustion.
Approaching GHG emissions is both more straightforward and much
more complex. It is more straightforward in concept because GHGs can
327. Ball, supra note 273, at A19.
328. FERREY, supra note 29, at ch. 6.
329. Curtis Carlson et al., Sulfur Dioxide Control by Electric Utilities: What are the
Gains From Trades? (Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper 98-44-Rev., 2000), http:/
/www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-DP-98-44-REV.pdf (describing acid rain program); see
also ROBERT C. ANDERSON & ANDREW Q. LOHOF, ENVTL. LAw INST., THE U.S. EXIE-
RIENCE WITH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION CONTROL POL-
ICY (1997) (describing the RECLAIM program); Alex Farrell et al., The NO, Budget:
Market-Based Control of Tropospheric Ozone in the Northeastern United States, 21 R.s. &
ENERGY ECON. 103-21 (1999) (describing the OTG program).
330. See ACID RAIN AND RELATED PROGRAMS, supra note 323, at 11 ("The ARP's
cap and trade approach offers emission sources the flexibility to comply with regulations
using their choice of the most cost-effective strategies available.").
331. 42 U.S.C. § 7651-7651(o).
332. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMIs-
SIONS AND SINKS 2-4 (2008), http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/downloads
09/07Inventory.pdf.
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be estimated with fair accuracy based on the use of fossil fuels. But a
fundamental shift in generating technologies or the successful capture
and long-term storage of CO 2 emissions needs to occur.
Because the preexisting U.S. emission allowance system for SO 2 and
NO, has an automatic penalty for non-compliance that is significantly
higher than the market price for acquiring those gases, coupled with a
liquid market for trading allowances, there is very high compliance with
required emissions levels in the SO 2 and NO,, trading programs. In ten
years of operation, there have been only twenty-one excess emissions pen-
alties, plus nine additional civil penalties for other violations, such as
failure to monitor and report emissions.33 3 Contrast this with the EU-
ETS scheme for registering compliance with emission of greenhouse
gases, which does not use actual measurements but calculates emissions
and carbons sequestration based on proxy values. The EU-ETS program
is decentralized in each of the E.U. member states, while the federal
Clean Air Act trading programs are centralized at the federal level in the
United States.334
The controversy that will beset the auction of allowances has not
characterized the U.S. auction of S02 and NO,, allowances, in part
because much fewer of these U.S. criteria emission allowances are associ-
ated with each MWh of electricity produced, and they trade at much
lower prices, than do CO 2 allowances in the E.U. 33 5 The EU-ETS trad-
ing system was modeled on the U.S. SO 2 trading system; however the
EU-ETS system covers four times as many emitters of one thousand
times more regulated tons of pollutants, with a trading value about ten
times higher.3 6 As the number of allowances needed increases, the
number freely allocated decreases, and their trading price mounts, there
will be an impact on regulated industries.
Federal proposals have sought to convert holders of state allowances,
as in RGGI, to federal allowances. Putting aside the issue of whether
there could be double-counting for compliance purposes, recall that
RGGI does not actually impose any reductions in business-as-usual car-
bon levels for its first six years of implementation, until 2015. This
opens the potential to purchase a more abundant, cheaper-state RGGI
allowance in times of surplus and have it converted to a potentially more
333. Joe Kruger & Christian Egenhofer, Confidence Through Compliance in Emis-
sions Trading Markets 5 n.21 (CEPS Policy Brief No. 99, Apr. 2006), http://shop.ceps.eul
downfree.php?item_id= 1323.
334. Joseph Kruger & William A. Pizer, The EU Emissions Trading Directive:
Opportunities and Potential Pitfalls 26 (Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper 04-24,
2004), http://www.rff.orgldocuments/RFF-DP-04-24.pdf.
335. EluERuiMAN & JosKow, supra note 238, at 30.
336. A. Denny Ellerman, New Entrant and Closure Provisions: How Do They Dis-
tort?, ENERGY J., Feb. 2008, at 63.
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expensive federal allowance. In any event, one could deploy the allow-
ance to its highest value application.
Similarly, many of the RGGI states will honor a RGGI allowance
from another RGGI state, which, given potential differences over time in
percentage share of allowances and offsets that may be used among the
RGGI states, offers another arbitrage opportunity. If an offset project to
create additional emission allowances is located outside of a participating
RGGI state, the sponsor of the offset project can pick any RGGI state in
which to file and use its credits.13 7 According to one industry source,
offsets are a "main avenue of compliance," because there is little that can
be done at an existing fossil-fuel-fired facility to control CO 2 emis-
sions.3 There could be arbitrage here, as any offset project would have
to be registered in just one RGGI state, and then could, if an MOU is in
place, be traded into another RGGI state. However, the flexibility of
different RGGI states in terms of registering offset projects under local
state rules could vary.
In comments, the Edison Electric Institute stated that 100% allow-
ance auction "virtually guarantees that there will be few, if any surplus
allowances available, which in turn will unduly constrain the effectiveness
of emissions trading." 339 They warned that since most of the carbon-
regulating RGGI states have restructured electric markets, there would be
no way to achieve government-controlled cost recovery of these allow-
ance expenses, thereby encouraging distribution utilities to buy from
cheaper, out-of-RGGI sources. 34 0 It noted that opening allowance sale
to all bidders, as most RGGI states are doing, could cause out-of-RGGI
generators to purchase allowances just to force the in-RGGI generators to
cease production for lack of sufficient allowances. 341
The Independent Power Producers of New York have indicated that
RGGI generators could be left short of necessary allowances with anyone
allowed to bid, and, additionally, have no means to recover their carbon-
related costs. 342 New York has set aside 1.5 million credits to assist gen-
erators operating under long-term contracts that do not consider carbon-
related costs, but the generators say that this is less than half as many as
needed. 34 3 State carbon regulation, with auctions and offsets, can be a
complex undertaking.
337. RGGI, MODEL RULE, supra note 69, § 10.3.
338. Unresolved Questions, supra note 111, at 7-8.
339. Ray Pospisil, As RGGI Prepares C0 2 Market, Utilities Fear 100% Allowance
Auction, Speculators, PLA-rrs ELEC. UTIL. WK., Jan. 7, 2008, at 9, 10.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Lisa Wood, New York Approves Rules fbr RGGI Carbon Trading; Independents
Object, PiArrs ELEC. UTIL. WK., Aug. 18, 2008, at 4.
343. Id. at 6.
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2. Federal Carbon Auction
The United States is poised to enact federal carbon control legisla-
tion. Versions of the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act in 2008 in
the Senate proposed an almost two-thirds reduction in CO 2 by 2050.
344
Initially one-quarter of CO 2 emission allowances would be auctioned to
recipients, raised to more than two-thirds by 2031. Fitch Ratings esti-
mated that the initial phase of U.S. cap-and-trade CO 2 emission reduc-
tions will cost electric utilities approximately $6.5 billion annually.34 5
The Waxman-Markey proposal in 2009 proposes a similar reduction.
Some of the federal carbon regulation bills considered by Congress
in 2008 would specifically provide that owners of RGGI or California
carbon allowances at the end of 2011, as early holders, would be com-
pensated for the costs they incurred in obtaining such state allowances.
346
This could allow for up to $7 billion in compensation of early action
parties under this concept. 347 Separate legislation, H.R. 6186, intro-
duced by Committee Chair Ed Markey, would auction 94-100% of its
allowances, and raise $8 trillion in auction proceeds, which would be
devoted to technologies, greenhouse gas reduction, and training for low-
carbon jobs.3 48 Various Congressional bills would include a provision to
cause imported goods from countries lacking carbon controls to be cov-
ered by emission allowances attributable to U.S.-made goods.34 9 Certain
lower-carbon gas fired generation owners of electric power plants actually
support the auction of allowances. 350 "Auctions are a polite way of say-
ing 'carbon tax,"' according to Jim Rogers, CEO of Duke Energy.35 t
California in August 2008 executed a Memorandum of Under-
standing to qualify advance offset projects in six Mexican states as offsets
344. Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2007, S. 2191, 110th Cong. § 2
(2007).
345. Fitch Puts Utilities' Initial CO2 Program Cost at $65 Bil; It Sees Cap-and-
Trade Imminent, PLr-rs ELEC. UTIL. WK., Nov. 13, 2006, at 10. This was modeled on a
RGGI-capped model with carbon allowances trading at $10/allowance. It also concluded
that thousands of megawatts of electric generation capacity would have to be replaced
with zero-emission energy sources.
346. Christine Cordner, Regional Greenhouse Groups Urge Congress to Keep Them in
Mind as it Acts on Carbon Bills, PLATrs ELEC. UTIL. WK., June 9, 2008, at 9.
347. Id
348. Cathy Cash et al., Carbon Bill's Promised Day in the Sun Fails; Sights Shift to
Next Year and New President, PLA-rrs ELEC. UTIL. WK., June 9, 2008, at 1, 10.
349. Cathy Cash, House Tax Panel to Start Focusing on Carbon Trading Issues in
Falk Eyes its Role in Policy, PLATrs ELEC. UTIL. WK., Aug. 18, 2008, at 3.
350. Cash et al., supra note 348, at 9. This group, the Clean Energy Group's
Clean Air Policy Initiative, includes Avista, Calpine, Constellation Energy, Entergy,
Exelon, FPL Group, National Grid, and PSEG Corp. Most are owners of non-coal
generation.
351. Rosenthal, supra note 215, at Al.
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in California or under a federal program. 352 Some environmental groups
believe that this avoids the responsibility in AB 32 to make the reduc-
tions in the state." 3 Offsets and their physical viability have been chal-
lenged by members of Congress.3 54 The issue is whether certain projects
satisfy "additionality," or would have occurred anyway even without the
availability of offset credits. 3 55 The Western state WCI program will
allow participating states to use CDM and JI Kyoto credits as offsets." 6
CDM offset credits are created in developing countries. Environmental
groups have complained not only about the out-of-region offsets, but
also about there being no requirement to auction all allowances to raise
revenue.
357
There are significant tax differences between traditional allowance
allocation without charge and the proposed auction of allowances to the
highest bidder. A free allocation of carbon credits is a tax-free exchange
under either a value added tax (VAT) or income tax, either in the E.U. or
under Kyoto, as have been the free allocation of NO, and SO2 emission
allowances in the U.S. If a carbon credit must be purchased, however,
this becomes a taxable event.
The Obama Administration has been pushing for 100% auction of
allowances, but began compromising in April 2009 when it had difficulty
getting Congressional consensus, even among Democratic members of
Congress. 358 A former Clinton EPA Administrator and Obama advisor
on carbon, writing with one of Barack Obama's advisors, has noted that
carbon auction, as federal legislation, would impose billions of dollars of
cost on the economy.35 9 Obama would limit, and have the EPA censor
the use of, offsets, according to these officials.36 ° With the approxi-
mately $1 trillion federal bailout of financial institutions in Fall 2008,
there is increased political interest in the potential revenues to be realized
from auctioning, rather than distributing without charge, carbon
allowances. 36 ' The alternative of giving away carbon emission
352. Mexico, California Sign Agreement to Develop GHG-Offiet Projects, CARBON
CONTROL NEWS, Aug. 25, 2008, at 8.
353. Id.
354. Cathy Cash, Republicans Seek Committee Probe of International Carbon Offiet
Market, PLArrs ELEC. UTIL. WK., Apr. 21, 2008, at 4.
355. Id,
356. Western GHG Trading Plan Draws Concern Over Offiets, Auctions, CARBON
CONTROL NEWS, July 28, 2008, available at http://carboncontrolnews.com/index.php/
ccn/show/western-ghg.trading-plan drawsconcernsoveroffsetsauctions/.
357. Id.
358. Dean Scott, Obama Team "Still Pushing" Full Auction of Carbon Emissions,
But Suggests Flexibility, 67 Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) A-9 (April 10, 2009).
359. Browner & Sussman, supra note 220, at A23.
360. Id.
361. Obey, supra note 2.
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allowances to sectors of U.S. industry that are particularly vulnerable to
foreign competition also is under consideration in the Congress.
362
However, early in 2009, the legislative sponsors of climate change
legislation had to back away from total initial auction of carbon
allowances. Representative Edward Markey, sponsor of the Waxman-
Markey climate legislation in the House of Representatives, announced
that he had abandoned the 100% allowance auction that he had pro-
posed, at least for the near term. 36 3 Concern about the cost of carbon
control was shaving legislative support from assertive federal carbon emis-
sion limitation. Free allocation of a portion of allowances seemed to be
the quid quo pro for support from representatives of certain states. The
Edison Electric Institute urged that electric utilities should get the same
proportion of free allowances as all other industries.3 64
C. Cost of Carbon Control
1. Financial Impacts on the Economy
While the impacts will not be identical, all areas of the world will be
affected by global warming. 365 However, price impacts of control will
depend on the methods of auctioning or dispersing allowances and will
be extremely different by their very design. The dispute between politi-
cal parties in a country can highlight different philosophies of allocation.
The initial allocation of allowances to emit pollutants has significant
implications for the distribution of wealth among industries, and among
nations. 3 6 6 With the approximately $1 trillion U.S. federal bailout of
financial institutions in Fall 2008, there is increased political interest in
the potential revenues to be realized from auctioning, rather than distrib-
uting without charge, carbon allowances.367
There are multiple economic impacts of carbon control.
Gross Costs to the Economy. MIT estimates that the cost of CO 2
allowances if sold would be $1-500 billion annually.368 Climate change
legislation in the U.S. is expected to generate $150 billion in new assets
362. Dean Scott, Free Allowances, Other Safeguards Debated for Sectors Vulnerable
Under Emissions Caps, 51 Daily Envt. Rep. (BNA) A-2 (Mar. 19, 2009).
363. Waxman, Markey Seek Moderate Votes for Their Stringent Climate-Change Bill,
PLATTS INSIDE ENERGY, Apr. 20, 2009, at 7, 8.
364. Cathy Cash, Official Effort at Climate-Energy Bill Illustrates the Kinds of
Tradeoffi That Will be Necessary, PlAT-s ELEC. UTIL. WK., Apr. 27, 2009, at 1, 29.
365. IPCC GROUP II REPORT, supra note 43.
366. Sheila M. Olmstead & Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful Second Commitment
Period for the Kyoto Protocol, ECONOMISTS' VOICE, May 2007, at 1, 4, http://www.
bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1 230&context=ev.
367. Obey, supra note 2.
368. Tobey Winters, CO2 Cap-and-Trade: Should Industry Speak Up or Sign On?,
ELEC. J., May 2008, at 11 n.8.
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in the first year alone, and $3 trillion of U.S. asset value by 2050.369 The
value of revenue raised by the auction of federal carbon allowances is
estimated to be $6.7 trillion by 2050, according to Senate Committee
Chair Barbara Boxer.3
7 °
Gross domestic product is scheduled to decrease because of the
higher energy and transportation costs embedded in manufactured prod-
ucts.37 1 Manufacturing and industrial activity in the U.S. would be
affected more than the general economy. The money raised from auc-
tioning even 75% of the federal carbon allowances would be hundreds of
billions of dollars by 2020, and climbing thereafter.372  This would
increase household energy costs by up to $325 by 2020 and by up to
$723 by 2030. If allowances were auctioned, it could raise between
$113-853 billion, according to EIA.373
Commodity Price Impact to Consumers. Second, there would be a
significant impact on consumer energy prices. The impact of a cap-and-
trade program would not ultimately be borne by industry, but would be
passed on to consumers.3 74 Giving away, rather than selling, the
allowances to emit CO 2 is justified as a cost-reduction rather than reve-
nue-raising mechanism for the government, as selling the allowances
would double the cost to the economy. 375 A recent poll indicates that
72% of California voters believe that California is on the wrong track,
resulting in higher than expected costs to be imposed on residents.3 76
If approximately one ton of carbon is created per megawatt hour of
electricity produced by coal-fired generation, then a cost of $1 0/ton for a
carbon credit translates into an increase of approximately $.01/kWh in
the price of electricity. This is an increase of about 15% in cost. For
natural-gas-fired generation, the CO 2 emissions are approximately half
this coal-fired amount, with approximately one-half ton of CO2 emis-
sions per megawatt hour. At $10/ton for the cost of CO 2 allocations or
369. Marc Gunther, A $3 Trillion Climate Change Battle, FORTUNE, May 15,
2008, available at http://money.cnn.com/2008/05/14/news/economy/climate-change_
bill.fortune/index.htm. This assumes carbon allowances are selling for about $30 each,
equivalent to E.U. credit trading prices.
370. Cash et al., supra note 348, at 8.
371. GHG Bill to Raise Electricity Costs 5-27% by 2020, Dow JONES, May 1,
2008.
372. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ENERGY MARKET AND
ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF S. 2191, THE LIEBERMAN-WARNER CLIMATE SECURITY ACT
xiii (2008).
373. Cathy Cash, EM Says Cap-Trade Bill Would Kick Prices up 64%; Advocates
Say Economics are Viable, PLATrs ELEC. UTIL. WK., May 5, 2008, at 3.
374. Climate Change Legislation, supra note 225, at 34.
375. Id. at 35.
376. Industry Poll Claims Lack of Support for California Climate Law, CARBON
CONTROL NEWS, Aug. 25, 2008, at 14. This reports an EMC Research, Inc., survey
released in August 2008.
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credits, this would add approximately $75/year or 10% to the cost of the
average household electricity bill.
However, it is unclear that $1 0/ton for a carbon allocation or credit
is a realistic price projection. E.U. credits have traded at twice this price,
and three times this price in extremes. The Congressional Budget Office
estimated that the cost of an allowance would start to be traded at $23/
ton.377 A review of twenty-eight studies of the damage of a ton of CO 2
shows a median value of $3.80/ton and a mean value of $25.10/ton. 378
A late 2007 report by Credit Suisse indicates that "carbon pricing will
likely need to rise above $40/ton to achieve 'meaningful reductions' in
CO 2 emissions from the utility sector."379 According to the U.S. Electric
Power Research Institute (EPRI), the cost of CO 2 control in the U.S.
could skyrocket to $300/ton removed if there is an emphasis on use of
natural gas. 38
0
Interestingly, the estimated price of emissions allowances or offsets
is much higher than the single-digit levels forecast near-term by some of
the states. RGGI studies projected that CO2 offsets and allocations will
only trade at $2.50/ton. This would signify a surplus of credits and off-
sets to result in this suppressed price. 3 1  RGGI offsets traded at $7-10/
ton even before the first auction of RGGI allowances,3 82 and in the first
three rounds of RGGI auctions were in the $3-4/ton range.
Three mechanisms exist to reduce price volatility in the cost of CO 2
credits. The first is to create banking across various periods of time so
that excess credits from one period are transferable to the next period.
The EU-ETS system does not allow this. 38 3 The second mechanism is to
allow borrowing against future credits not yet created. The third mecha-
nism is to create a safety valve that caps the cost of emission allowances at
a set price, has the government release into the market surplus allowances
at a set price, or creates additional types of eligible credits and offsets to
increase supply under certain pricing conditions. The RGGI model
attempts to do the latter by having pricing triggers at which a wider
variety of credits from different geographic regions can satisfy an increas-
377. Climate Change Legislation, supra note 225, at 32.
378. CLIMATE CHANGE ECONOMICS AND POLICY: AN RFF ANTHOLOGY
(Michael A Toman ed., 2008).
379. Lisa Weinzimer & Christine Cordner, Some Utilities Need To Be More Aggres-
sive to be Readyfrr Carbon Constraints: Report, PLATrs ELEC. UTIL. WK., Mar. 10, 2008,
at 9, 10.
380. Paul Carlsen, "Optimists" on Clean Coal and CO2 Cuts Win Show-ofHands
Votes at EEl London, PLArrs ELEC. UTIL. WK., Mar. 17, 2008, at 1, 15.
381. Cathy Cash, Banks, Investment Firms, Others Find Positions fr Gigantic Car-
bon Market; Eye Policy Options, PLATrs ELEC. UTIL. WK., June 30, 2008, at 2, 19.
382. Id.
383. Council Directive 2003/87, art. 14, 2003 O.J. (L 275) (EC); see generally
ELLERMAN & JOSKOW, supra note 238 (analyzing development, structure, and perform-
ance of EU-ETS).
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ing percentage of total compliance responsibilities. Creating offsets
essentially is a subsidy to reduce the private cost of compliance mecha-
nism requirements with CO 2.384
The proposed 2008 Lieberman-Warner legislation was designed to
achieve a 40% emissions reduction by 2030, 11% below 1990 levels. 3 "5
The legislation concentrates the greatest emissions reduction on the elec-
tric utility sector, with a modest impact on the transportation sector evi-
denced by an estimated $0.53/gallon increase in gasoline by 2030 and
$1.40/gallon by 2050.386 U.S. carbon control legislation is forecast by
the U.S. Department of Energy to increase electricity prices by 5-27%
by 2020, and by 11-64% by 2030.387 Duke Energy, a major U.S. power
company, predicted that consumer retail electric bills would jump 50%
due to the costs of compliance with the Lieberman-Warner legislation.3 88
A report by the National Association of Manufacturers forecast that
a federal carbon cap-and-trade system similar to the Lieberman-Warner
bill by 2030 would increase gasoline prices by 60-144%, increase elec-
tricity prices by 77-129%, increase natural gas prices by 84-146%, elim-
inate three to four million jobs, and reduce GDP by half a trillion
dollars. 38 9 This model forecasts a trading price of carbon emission cred-
its in the range of $61-83/ton of CO 2e, with electricity prices increasing
44% by 2030 and 26% by 2050.390 If use of either international or
domestic offsets is limited, it drives up the price impacts and costs of
allowances more than otherwise assumed. 39 In any event, the price
impact on energy commodities will be significant.
NRDC argues that the money raised in auctions could be used to
reduce regressive taxes on the poor.392 Under this scenario, electricity
prices would increase, but taxes would be reduced on certain segments of
the population. In such a scenario, electricity providers would be seen as
hiking their costs of providing an essential service and commodity, while
the government would reap additional revenues and might provide tax
384. Billy Tizer, Resources for the Future, Presentation at Harvard Electricity Pol-
icy Group, JFK School of Government, 48th Plenary Sess. (May 31-June 1, 2007).
385. OFFICE OF ATMOSPHERIC PROGRAMS, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA
ANALYSIS OF THE LIEBERMAN-WARNER CLIMATE SECURITY ACT OF 2008 (Mar. 14,
2008), http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/downloads/s219 l-EPA_,Analysis.pdf.
386. Id. at 2.
387. GHG Bill to Raise Electricity Costs, supra note 371.
388. Cathy Cash, Coal Utilities Say They Do Not Fear Risk to Credit, Despite
Moody's Warning on Carbon Burdens, PLATTs ELEC. UTIL. WK., Mar. 3, 2008, at 1, 32.
389. Gerald Karey, Manufacturers Association Report Sees Dire Outcome Under Sen-
ate GHG Bill, PLATrs ELEC. UTIL. WK., Mar. 17, 2008, at 7, 7-8.
390. OFFICE OF ATMOSPHERIC PROGRAMS, supra note 385, at 3. This model has
fossil fuel use in the U.S. declining after 2010, with an increase in nuclear, natural gas,
and renewable power use.
391. Id.
392. Barry, supra note 95.
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reductions to certain groups. The U.N. Foundation has recommended
against any revenues raised from auction of cap-and-trade carbon
allowances being devoted to low-income assistance programs because that
supports use of fossil fuels in energy inefficient homes instead of offering
long-term investment in more efficient or lower-carbon use of energy.
393
The rebate of carbon auction revenues to poor consumers, to offset some
of the higher cost of electric power incorporating carbon auction prices,
is criticized by Robert Repetto of the U.N. Foundation, and favored by
Resources for the Future. 394 As discussed above, the U.S. emissions pro-
grams and the E.U. carbon program have always elected to provide
allowances to emit without charge.
395
The Congressional Budget Office projected that carbon control
costs to lower- or middle-income households could be subsidizing them
at the cost of upper income households. 396 This concern for not wanting
to engender constituent complaints is exactly what has caused developing
nations to argue that they should not be included in any multilateral
carbon reduction requirements or penalties under the Kyoto Protocol.
Therefore, both worldwide and in the U.S., carbon policy has contested
auction as a way to redistribute wealth.
Fights over the use of proceeds from auctioning carbon allowances
have already emerged in the RGGI scheme. The Connecticut governor
sought to funnel some of these proceeds to state ratepayers and was
halted by an opinion of the Connecticut attorney general that such
would violate the state's RGGI legislation, which dedicated such funds
for energy efficiency and renewable energy.3 97 Lurking behind such
issues is the constitutional question of whether selling allowances and
dedicating and utilizing proceeds either for in-state energy efficiency
investments, or in-state consumer rebates, raises any Commerce Clause
problems.3 9 '
"Leakage. " In states that have deregulated their power markets and
where there has been divestiture of power plants, CO 2 allowances that are
allocated without charge to independent wholesale generators will not be
accounted for, nor will they directly benefit consumers and ratepayers as
they might in a regulated state. Forcing power producers to pay for all of
their allowances could also create a competitive disadvantage for in-state
producers, if neighboring states' generators are given allowances without




396. Climate Change Legislation, supra note 225, at 34.
397. Lisa Wood, Connecticut's AG Challenges Governor's Push to Channel Some
RGGIMoney to Ratepayers, PiAr'rs ELEc. UTIL. WK., July 21, 2008, at 8.
398. See Ferrey, Goblets of Fire, supra note 217.
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tored into any existing long-term power contracts. Generators fear that
they will not be able to adjust contract prices to account for them. 39 9
2. Price Impact on Electricity Markets
A study by the EIA found that the electric utility industry would
bear 80% of the burden imposed by the pending U.S. federal carbon
legislation. When electricity prices go up dramatically, there is a history
of political and economic turmoil in U.S. markets. California, the largest
state in the Union, and one of the five largest economies in the world,
provides the most well-known example. In 2001, the most essential and
capital-intensive industry in the United States collapsed. °0 0 The Califor-
nia electric market failure fundamentally tested the role of legal and regu-
latory institutions overseeing the most essential commodity in the
industrialized world. This crisis arrested the national trajectory of
deregulation.
In 1998, California became the third state in the nation, after Mas-
sachusetts and Rhode Island, to restructure its electric sector, allow retail
competition, and force or incentivize its investor-owned utilities to sell
their generating assets. The retail value of the California electric market
in 2000 was approximately $20 billion, with a peak load of 53 GW and
electric consumption at 264,000 GWh.40 1
Power shortages began in summer 2000 in California.4"2 During
the first four months of 2000, prices in the wholesale market on an
hourly basis averaged about $30/MWh.4 °3 In June, July, and August
2000, average prices on the spot market quadrupled to about $125/
MWh, and exceeded $200/MWh at times.40 4 What was unusual about
these price levels was that they often occurred not just for a few peak
hours around mid-day but lasted all day long.40 5 Prices continued to
increase as 2000 progressed. During the summer of 2000, spot market
prices for electricity in California increased by 500%, and then doubled
399. See generally RGGI, Draft Meeting Summary, Regional Stakeholder Meeting
(May 2, 2006), http://www.rggi.org/docs/stakeholder-meeting-summary-5-2-06.pdf.
400. Cal. Energy Comm'n, 2003 Integrated Energy Policy Report (Dec. 2003),
http://www.energy.ca.gov/reports/100-03-019F.pdf.
401. Allan Chen, The California Energy Crisis: A Brief Summary of Events, ENVTL.
ENERGY TECH. Div. NEWS, Summer 2001, http://eetdnews.lbl.gov/nl8/Crisis.html.
Utilities supply approximately half of this load, with non-utility generators supplying
approximately two-thirds of the remainder and importation from out of state supplying
the rest.
402. CHRISTOPHER WEARE, THE CALIFORNIA ELECTRICITY CRISIS: CAUSES AND
POLICY OPTIONS vi (2003), http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R-103CWR.pdf.
403. John Jurewitz, California's Electricity Debacle: A Guided Tour, ELEC. J., May
2002, at 10, 16.
404. Id.
405. Id.
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from that new plateau at the end of the calendar year,4" 6 while California
is normally a summer-peaking system.4" 7 Not only did prices in Califor-
nia increase by 500% in late 2000 from the year before, but prices were
approximately ten times what they were in 1998.408
During January and February 2001, the ISO declared "Stage III"
alerts, leading to rolling blackouts in some utility service territories.409 In
early February, the California utilities began defaulting on their payment
obligations for wholesale power to the ISO and the Power Exchange. On
January 17, 2001, Governor Davis declared a state of emergency based
on an "imminent threat of widespread and prolonged disruption of elec-
trical power."4 1 The first rolling blackouts in California since World
War II occurred on January 17, 2001.411 Even deeper blackouts
occurred on January 18, 2001, and power supply emergencies were
declared every day for the following thirty days.4 12
406. Lyn Lorum, As California PUC Probes Market, SDG&E Claim it Was Denied
Hedging Authority, POWER MARKETS WK., Aug. 28, 2000, at 1. Price spikes experienced
in deregulated wholesale markets included a price spike in the Midwest during the week
of June 22, 1998, with prices rising up to $7,500/MWh; a price of $10,000/MWh on
February 14-15, 1999 in the New York ancillary services market, which was repeated in
December 1998; prices in the New England ISO which rose to $6,000/MWh on May 8,
2000, and Pacific Northwest prices of $1,000/MWh in 2000 and 2001. Daniel Allen et
al., Union of Concerned Scientists, Generator Outage Increases: A Preliminary Analysis of
Outage Trends in the New England Electricity Market 5 (Jan. 2001), www.ucsusa.org/
assets/documents/clean_energy/neoutage.pdf (reporting New England price spike);
Northwest Wakes up to New Reality: Cheap Power Drained From Region, RETAIL SERV.
REP., Aug. 4, 2000, at 1; Peak Load Surges in Northeastern Heat; Three Systems Use Rolling
Blackouts, PLATTs ELEC. UTIL. WK., July 12, 1999, at 1 (reporting $10,000 price spike in
late June and early July of 1998); Price Spikes at New York ISO Trigger Review, Questions
About Market Gaming, PIlArTs ELEC. UTIL. WK., Feb. 21, 2000, at 6 (reporting prices of
$9,998.03 on the 14th and 15th); Wholesale Price Spikes: June 1998, http://americanhis-
tory.si.edu/powering/dereg/current2.htm (reporting June 25, 1998 Midwest price spike
of $7,500/Mwh); see also Market Volatility; Heat Strikes; Hello Spikes, POWER ECON.,
Sept. 2, 1999, at 8 (generally discussing 1999 price spikes).
407. Paul L. Joskow, California's Electricity Crisis 4 n.6 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 8442, 2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=281073.
408. Id. at 1, 52 tbl.1.
409. A "Stage III" alert is declared when reserve margins fall to less than 1.5%,
which they did on almost a daily basis during January and some of February 2001. The
first rolling blackout was imposed by Pacific Gas & Electric Co. on January 16, 2001.
See WEARE, supra note 402, at 19.
410. See Proclamation by the Governor of the State of California (Jan. 17, 2001),
available at http://wwwcers.water.ca.gov/pdfEfiles/about-us/govproclamation.pdf. Near-
ly twenty executive orders followed in the next six months addressing the crisis. See, e.g.,
Executive Order Archive, February 2001, http://www.gov.ca.gov/index.php?/archive/
executive-orders/2001/02/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2009); Executive Order Archive, March
2001, http://www.gov.ca.gov/index.php?/archive/executive-orders/2001/03/ (last visited
Apr. 28, 2009); Executive Order Archive, April 2001, http://www.gov.ca.gov/index.php?/
archive/executive-orders/2001/04/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2009).
411. Jurewitz, supra note 403, at 24.
412. Id.
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The institutional collapse caused California consumers to absorb an
average 9% retail electric rate increase in January 2001, and a 37% boost
in March 2001.1 13 The average California energy bill increased by 36%
from 2000 to 2001, according to a July 2001 J.D. Power and Associates
report.414 The cost of California's wholesale power rose from $7.4 bil-
lion in 1999 to $27.1 billion in 2000 before falling to $26.8 billion in
2001. 4 "
In a matter of a few months, the restructured California power mar-
ket created a $14 billion loss for the state purchasing power on behalf of
its essentially insolvent investor-owned utilities;4 16 this would have to be
subsidized and recouped over a decade by California taxpayers and rate-
payers. To pay for power, in March 2001, the California PUC finally
and belatedly increased rates by 40-50% (3C/kWh), the largest increase
in state history.4 1
7
California's cure drove a stake through the heart of retail competi-
tion there and in other states. At that time, the $43 billion in contracts
had a market value of approximately half the price at which they were
negotiated. 41 8 For other states on the verge of deregulating power mar-
kets, the California experience robbed those states of their nerve to de-
regulate. Every state backed away or delayed deregulation plans, based
solely on the California experience.
4 19
V. CONCLUSION
Carbon control is starting in half the U.S. states in the absence of
federal action. For the first time in either U.S. or world history, states
will auction the right to emit a pollutant to whoever wishes to purchase
it, rather than allocate without charge allowances to regulated emitters of
a pollutant. This will cause a massive increase of revenue for government
agencies and a significant increase in the price of electricity and other
commodities. It will also redistribute income among those directly and
indirectly affected. An auction of emission rights is new to U.S. environ-
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AUCTIONING THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF LIFE
mental regulation, and contrary to all similar regulatory precedent in the
world.
In addition, under both U.S. state, E.U., and Kyoto Protocol mech-
anisms, offsets are possible, which are other carbon reductions that create
tradable additional carbon compliance credits. These offsets as defined
in U.S. states take the additional step of prohibiting renewable energy
projects from qualifying as carbon offsets. Renewable power investments
are not recognized as carbon offsets because "the emission reduction
doesn't occur at the site of the renewable generator," but in backing out
other carbon-intensive generation.42° The intermittent nature of several
renewable power sources and their integration with the power grid make
each situation different. Environmental groups have questioned the
"additionality" of renewable energy projects, if their construction is not
because of the value of the offset sale.42 '
This misdirects the investment in additional projects away from the
essential shift in electricity base from renewable energy alternatives, and
reduces the projects eligible to create offsets, reducing offset supply.
When the supply of allowances and credits are restricted, this puts
upward pressure on the price of allowances and the economic cost of
carbon control compliance. The price impact, even without this upward
price pressure, is forecast in the billions of dollars just in the U.S. How
these costs are allocated among industry and consumers has impacts on
the shape and acceptability of carbon control.
Doing this regulation correctly has important implications. The
goal for carbon mitigation makes a significant difference in the econom-
ics of carbon control. Reducing a future forecast of carbon concentration
every 100 ppm-from 650 ppm to 550 ppm, or from 550 ppm to 450
ppm, etc.-is deemed to involve a ten-fold increase in cost for each addi-
tional 100 ppm reduction.422 Picking the correct target in the correct
timeframe is thus very important, especially given the international scope
of the problem. The leading U.S. climate scientist gives the world less
than a decade to accomplish a reversal of increasing GHG emissions.42 3
How the legal regulatory system designs this carbon control will write the
environmental future.
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